The New REPUBLIC

A Journal of Opinion

VOLUME XII | New York, Saturday, October 27, 1917 | Number 156

Contents

Editorial Notes 337

Leading Editorials
- Time and Victory 339
- Darkening Counsel 341
- Woman Suffrage in Wartime 343

General Articles
- "The Menace of Maximalism" ..... Norman Angell 345
- The Value of Time in the War 348
- Après la Guerre ..... Harry W. Frantz 351
- The Price of a Home—II ..... Julia Clark Hallam 353
- The War Industries Board ..... George Soule 354

Correspondence 356

Reviews of Books
- A War of Men ..... F. H. 358
- Sociologic Fiction ..... R. B. 359
- Restricting Matthew Arnold ..... E. B. 360

NO terms are in sight which would lead to a satisfactory peace. Such is the opinion of Lloyd George; it must also be the opinion of every unofficial observer of European affairs who refuses to subordinate facts to his desire. The German Kaiser still talks in terms of German victory; the German and Hungarian statesmen of the Dual Empire still insist that their influence shall be dominant in every part of the territory included within their old boundaries; Bulgaria still assumes that she is to annex not only parts of Macedonia that might reasonably have been transferred to her if she had joined the Allies instead of Germany, but much indisputably Serbian territory as well. Even Turkey momentarily shakes off her decrepitude, under the spell of the Kaiser's infectious boasting, and dreams of a regenerated Sultanate, with all the unassimilable elements of the empire expelled or exterminated. The peoples of the Central Empires doubtless yearn for peace. But the militaristic minorities remain in the saddle. How long they will remain in control is a question that no one can answer. When they show signs of weakening we may begin to look forward to peace. In the meantime our plain business is to put our whole energies into war and preparation for war. When we have a powerful army in France we shall begin to argue with autocracies in terms that they can understand. The peoples of the Central Empires will also begin to argue in terms that their rulers will hear.

ONE of the results of the Liberty Loan campaign will be to demonstrate to hundreds of thousands of persons that they are deluding themselves when they assert that they can never save a dollar. Most men can save something, or increase their savings somewhat when the necessity becomes more vivid in their minds than the pull of their customary desires. To many it will be a revelation how easy it is to deny themselves small luxuries and even many so-called necessities, when close spending becomes not only decent, but patriotic as well. The war is driving home one of the simplest and most fundamental of economic maxims: When you buy what you do not need you are wasting labor that the nation needs. Such a diversion of productive power may appear respectable under the light of peace, refracted as it must be in passing through the social strata. In time of war there is no proper place for social classes or class canons. Every man is expected to do his utmost. And the habit of thrift, established under the national necessity, is sure to outlast the war. It will be needed, to repair the waste of war at home and to assist in repairing the infinitely greater wastes in the countries whose prosperity is our own.

THE death of Senator Husting presents an occasion demanding the exercise of the purest and most intelligent patriotism on the part of the conservative elements in Wisconsin politics. A new senator will have to be chosen by popular vote. La Follette and the anti-war forces will no doubt be in the field with a candidate who combines opposition to the war with democratic views on labor, the regulation of corporations and taxation. The conservatives may be strongly tempted to set up a candidate whose unimpeachable patriotism is com-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bined with social and economic views that would be characterized as "sound" in financial circles. Wisconsin has a large German population, but unbiased observers report that the state is overwhelmingly in favor of the government's war policies. But Wisconsin is also overwhelmingly democratic in social-economic opinions. She might for the time sink her democratic preferences rather than incur the reproach of disloyalty, but she ought not to have the choice forced upon her. And the country ought not to be subjected to the risk of the defeat of a candidate who has made the issue of patriotism his own. America would be able to discount the result, but the Germans would not discount them. They would hold it for demonstration that the American electorate is opposed to the war, and that they have only to endure until the next congressional elections to see America go the way of Russia.

EVERY anti-war vote in New York City will be cast for Morris Hillquit. Judge Hylan may have hoped to garner some part of this vote, but he cannot meet the competition of a candidate who refuses even to subscribe to the Liberty Loan, who would like to see his country forced toward peace, even against its deliberate will, by failure of supplies for its armies. This concentration of the anti-war vote would be desirable if it could stand by itself. Americans who support their country in its war aims should welcome the opportunity for demonstrating that there is more smoke than fire in the anti-war movement. But unfortunately the vote for Hillquit will not represent exclusively, nor even chiefly, the anti-war movement. Thousands of persons, irritated by the ill advised attempts on the part of the local and federal authorities to suppress free discussion, will vote for Hillquit by way of protest. Thousands of other persons will do the same thing, believing that a heavy Socialistic vote will serve as a check to the anti-democratic tendencies that inevitably present themselves in wartime. But the aggregate Hillquit vote will be counted as a vote against the war, by our enemies at home and our enemies abroad.

A FRENCH authority quoted in The Times seeks to impress upon America the urgency of the earliest possible application of our forces to the war. His expressions are courteous, but they betray an undercurrent of impatience with our apparent slowness in getting into the fight. The French have reason to be impatient. When the German avalanche roamed down through Belgium France was not ready, but she had to check it, spending the lives of her sons in lieu of ammunition. Month after month France had to hold out, waiting for the great British army to be organized and equipped and trained for modern warfare. There were delays that were inevitable, and delays that might have been avoided, and for both France paid, in long casualty lists extending through interminable months and years. At last Britain was ready, but in the meantime the Germans had reached the zenith of their power and the Russians, industrially equipped for only a brief war, could no longer hold their due proportion of the German forces on the eastern front. America was needed to make up a preponderance of power that might thrust the Germans from French soil. We were not ready; we are not ready yet; and in the meantime the French and British hold out, and pay, the French most of all, in proportion to their resources. Much of our delay has been inevitable; some part of it was not. Were it all inevitable, we still could not blame the French for chafing under it. Nor should we be surprised if we were told that there are Frenchmen who ask, What is the profit to us from this interminable waiting, these unending sacrifices for the common cause? We have already paid out the lives of more of our men than there are men in Alsace-Lorraine; shall we pay as many more? We shall not renounce Alsace-Lorraine and make peace, but if we did, where would our allies stand?

SO far as concerns the application of our financial and industrial resources, we have little excuse to offer for our delays. The French authority asserts that we spent four months in deciding what type of aeroplane motor we should use, instead of setting our industry at work producing types already found serviceable at the front. He might also have dwelt upon the time we spent in deciding what kind of ships to build; the time it has taken us to come around to three shifts in our ship-yards —we are only now at the point of introducing the system of continuous operation;—the delay in providing our new levies with arms. But his chief complaint is directed against our delay in landing large forces in France. Send men, trained or untrained, as soon as possible, he urges. They can be got ready more expeditiously in France. This may possibly be true. Proximity to the firing line may conceivably offer technical advantages that outweigh the disadvantages of placing the additional strain upon our scanty tonnage of supplying an army in France during the period of training. American military opinion would probably not agree with French opinion on this point. But what chiefly militates against the plan of sending raw levies is the effect the policy would be likely to exert upon American public opinion. The feeling might easily gain currency that sending these men to France untrained would result in their being

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

thrust into the trenches unprepared. The French have faced the cost of employing men inadequately trained, but the enemy was at their gates.

GERMANY'S enemies, so the press from time to time informs us, are contemplating the adoption of German methods of handling foreign trade. Raw materials are to be cornered in the national interest; essential food supplies and materials are to be imported under government auspices; the export trade is to be worked up by semi-public agencies, working for the nation as well as for private profit. From Germany, on the other hand, we hear occasionally of protests of business men against precisely the same policy as pursued by the German government. German merchants assert that in the tremendous work of reconstituting the national prosperity after the war, they will need above all things liberty. In their opinion the nation as a trader is not so efficient, not so capable of working out adjustments to the fluctuating conditions of world economy, as the collectivity of private traders would be. Is it not possible that the world has naively taken at their face value German official assertions of the benefits trade has derived from governmental direction? The great strides in German trade before the war were certainly due chiefly to a methodical workmanship that had nothing to do with Prussianism, and an obliging, ingratiating disposition on the part of German agents abroad that stood in marked contradiction to the spirit of the German government.

THE latest group to discover German backing and I. W. W. support behind the opposition's program is the National Anti-Suffrage Association. No direct charges of an alliance are made, but it is pointed out that the agitation for suffrage at this time is giving aid and comfort to the enemy, pleasing both the Kaiser and the I. W. W. This method of attack is worth noting because it shows how, as the war goes on, the issue of patriotism will be introduced where there is no place for it. It is also worth noting because of the remarkable deduction it draws as to the relation of woman suffrage and the I. W. W.: "The I. W. W.'s are stronger in suffrage states than in any other part of the country, because the doubling of their strength through the votes of their women makes their class vote a powerful political weapon, while the women of the other classes largely stay away from the polls." It is hard to see how this reasoning is anything but a tribute to the civic interest of the I. W. W. women. Anti-suffrage is making a curious stand when it wants the privileges of democracy to accrue to the apathetic.

Time and Victory

"WE can wait," declared the German Chancellor in a recent speech. "Time is working for us." This boast deserves careful examination, for if the accomplishment of the political aims for which the Allies are fighting becomes a matter of physical and moral endurance, and if the Germans can afford to wait longer than their enemies, they would have a better chance of being ultimately successful. But it is true only in part, and it can be prevented from being true at all. In one limited though important respect time is counting against the Allies. In other respects it can be made to count in their favor. The success of the Allied cause will depend largely upon the Allied ability to overcome time in so far as it is their enemy and to put it to good use in so far as it is their friend.

At present the armies of the Allies possess the initiative in France and Italy and threaten to take it in Macedonia. In a very real sense time always works against an attacking army. Within a limited period an attack must gain its object or be shifted or abandoned. If the defense can hold out long enough it can claim a military success. In so far, consequently, as the winning of the war depends upon a victorious military offensive, delay is working for the Germans. The more time the offensive consumes the more likely it is to be ultimately thwarted. The inference is obvious, and it is pressed home in the article written by a French staff officer published elsewhere in this issue. Every effort should be made by the Allied governments to launch their attack against the German lines with the utmost possible power and at the earliest possible moment. A military offensive will have its maximum chance of success next spring and summer. If it has to be continued into the following year, no one can tell what may happen to hamper its ultimate effectiveness. The adversaries of Germany are made up of a coalition, certain members of which possess much greater powers of sustained fighting than others. One of the most important members of the anti-German combination has been obliged to withdraw from the attack, and its withdrawal prevented the Allied staffs from accomplishing all they planned during the past summer. If the offensive has to be prolonged into 1919 the strain upon other members of the coalition may be more than their physical resources can endure.

These limitations upon the credit of time against which the Allies can draw for successful offensive military operations have a particular bearing upon the activities of the United States. The other members of the combination against Germany have already reached or passed beyond the highest point of their military preparation. They may be able

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to sustain the fighting power of their armed forces at its existing level, but except in minor ways they can hardly increase it. Because they cannot increase it, they can do little now to diminish the time in which the larger and better equipped army can be made to count in the actual military operations. The United States, on the other hand, is laboring to bring to the aid of the western Allies an increment of military force. The date at which a sufficient volume of that force can be brought to bear on the fighting will make an enormous, perhaps a decisive, difference. Every trained man, every heavy gun, every aeroplane and every destroyer or transport which can be whipped into use for next summer will possess several times the military value of a man, a gun or a ship which will not be fighting until the following year. Every American soldier who can be placed on the front next June will possess several times the military value of a soldier who will not be available until next October. Under the circumstances, the quickness of American military preparation is no less important than its efficiency or its volume. The American army is part of an attacking force, and the attack cannot be indifferently prolonged.

But the ability of the Allies to accomplish their war aim does not and should not be allowed to depend exclusively on the success of a military offensive on the western front. No matter how excellent his chance of success, every prudent general prepares against the possibility of failure; and it is the more necessary to do so in the present instance because at best the culminating offensive of the Allied armies will take many months to develop. During this interval not only can the Allies exert themselves to overcome time in its rôle of enemy, but they can put it to good use in its rôle of friend. In point of fact time is working for the Allies far more than for the Central Powers. In spite of the disadvantages of being a coalition the Allies possess in the blockade, in the increase of the moral opposition to Germany throughout the neutral world and in the essential righteousness of their own cause, weapons which will or can be made to operate during time with gathering force, no matter whether they succeed next summer in winning a decisive victory.

A convincing answer to the Chancellor's boast, "We can afford to wait," is returned by the official German peace propaganda. If Germany were sure of being able successfully to defend her present lines, if she were certain of her ability to maintain indefinitely the will of her own people to fight and to suffer, she would not be agitating for peace. Her "peace offensive" has two different but supplementary purposes, both of which are expressive of an inability to wait. She fears the effect of the economic and military pressure upon her own population and that of her associates; and she is seeking to weaken that pressure by an agitation for peace which will divide the members of the Allied coalition one against another, and perhaps provoke classes of the Allied populations to agitate against their governments. But the German government is even more concerned about the loss of fighting morale among its own people and the people of its allies. By its peace propaganda it seeks to strengthen the defense psychology of the German, Austrian and Hungarian nations, to convince them of the necessity of meeting with inexorable defiance any disposition on the part of their enemies to grind their faces. Having failed to obtain a victory by the quick concentration of superior military force, the German government is trying in its hour of distress to organize for its own benefit the essentially moral forces, which are associated in the minds of all the peoples with the defense of their soil and the security of their national life.

The Allied governments can plan and carry out an answer to this strategy which will completely defeat it. The answer consists in the first place of taking every advantage of the military initiative which the German staff has presented against its will to the staff of the Allied armies. Our French military correspondent has every justification in insisting that from this point of view time is all-important and that literally no expense and no effort should be spared by America in placing on the western front at the earliest possible moment a maximum of capable military power. Not only is a quick and powerful American military concentration necessary to the success of the Allied armies, but its coming will cast a shadow before, which will improve the diplomatic position of the Allied governments. It will force the German government to hasten its preparations and to go faster and further with its peace agitation than it has yet done. The result may well be to provoke a vigorous protest from the Pan-Germans and increase rather than diminish the internal dissensions in that country. But the Allies cannot stake their chance of victory exclusively on a military offensive whose success depends so largely upon its speed. They must answer it also with a counter diplomatic attack which will stimulate into still more dangerous activity the existing dissensions in Germany, which will impair the defense psychology of the German people and which will at the same time diminish the danger of dissension among their own coalition.

As we have so frequently pointed out, President Wilson's answer to the Pope made an admirable beginning for the counter diplomatic attack. The policy of offering a peace of reconciliation to the German people, provided they repudiate and reform their own government, but war to the end if

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

they refuse, will stimulate dissension in Germany and impair the defense psychology of the German people, while at the same time it will enable the Allies to reap the full immediate advantage of their military superiority and economic preponderance. But this counter-propaganda, while President Wilson has started it going and France and Great Britain have acquiesced, has been left in the air. It has been used to encourage dissensions in Germany, but nothing has been done as yet to add to it the supplementary precaution of preventing or repairing dissensions among the Allies. Every one knows that real dissension exists, that Russia, Italy, France, Great Britain and America all have their special national or international programs, and that these programs influence their military policies and their powers of physical and moral endurance. Every one knows too that the German government is laboring stubbornly and intelligently to take advantage of that dissension. Neither a quick and powerful military offensive nor a counter diplomatic attack is consequently a safe and sufficient defense against the German peace initiative. The one way of safeguarding the sacred cause of the Allies against the disaster of a German diplomatic success is an honest attempt to do away with the cause of the dissension.

In relation to this point some difference of opinion exists. There is a disposition to believe that the way in which the dissensions can best be cured is to ignore or deny their existence, and to stamp out by force in all the Allied countries any disposition to call attention to them. Surely such a policy is doomed to fail. Minority public opinion all over the world is recovering its vitality, except, perhaps, in this country, and it cannot be coerced. It is, moreover, an unworthy policy for a group of democracies comprising a "league of honor" to adopt even during war. The only safe and honorable method of dealing with these dissensions is to settle down to the task of healing them. No doubt this is more easily said than done, but as long as it remains undone a grave weakness will be allowed to exist in the whole defense system of the Allies; and sooner or later an alert and aggressive enemy like Germany will break through and imperil the alliance. The coming inter-Allied conference in Paris offers an early and excellent opportunity of dealing candidly and bravely with these dissensions. The American government has fortunately made up its mind actively to participate in the conference and it should be able to exercise a useful influence on behalf of inter-Allied unity. The President's reply to the Pope could be made into a promising basis of mediation and conciliation. Implicit in that document is a statement of Allied war aims, upon which the Allies must eventually agree because it is born of their own better and more essential interests. It would be based upon a sharp distinction between the terms they would exact from the present German government and the terms they would offer to a German government which was subject to popular control. The former would be determined to a considerable extent by military considerations and would consist in large measure of material guaranties. The latter would be determined rather by the will to organize an enduring peace, the principles of which have already been outlined by the President in his Senate address of January last. Once an agreement is reached on this basis, the alliance becomes impregnable, and time, so far from being Germany's friend, would become her deadliest and most implacable enemy.

Darkening Counsel

THAT an unbalanced, confused and wayward public opinion may become, in times like these, a grave public danger is almost a truism; that there can be no sound and discerning public opinion where the most fundamental issues are systematically confused and distorted is hardly less so. Yet an important section of the American press seems increasingly bent upon so confusing certain fundamental issues of national policy with reference to the war, and upon introducing into the discussion of them a blinding bitterness of temper which, if it increases, can only end by making wise decisions concerning them impossible, except by accident. These efforts, if successful, will end in defeating the aims and policy with which America entered the war.

One main confusion—as well as the bitterness of temper which goes with it—is illustrated, among other things, by the recurrent attacks upon The New Republic and the policy for which, in common with such negligible elements as the President of the United States, it has stood and still stands.

Those attacks are usually based upon the implication, or direct statement, that this journal is in favor of an early, or premature, or "German" peace, by negotiation with the enemy as an alternative to an energetic prosecution of the war; the statement sometimes accompanied by references usual in this type of controversy to cowardice, semi-sedition, and betrayal of the boys at the front.

It is not as a controversy between rival journals or writers that the matter is important but as the symptom of a growing confusion in American opinion and development of American policy.

The general policy of this journal remains of course what it was when, among the very first of American papers, it stood for America's participa-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tion in the war as the fulfilment of a duty to her own highest interests and those of civilization. It has been stated many times. It is to prosecute the war with the utmost vigor; but concurrently to take every opportunity of making it increasingly plain to the enemy peoples that the end for which we fight does not challenge either their national security or their vital interest. It is obviously the interest of the enemy governments to persuade their peoples of the exact contrary. In the last analysis the power of those governments, now to carry on the war and later to maintain their autocratic institutions, depends upon the degree to which they can maintain the general German conviction that vital German interests demand the support of the present policy, governments and institutions. Part of the object in German peace manoeuvres undoubtedly was, by provoking a blunt refusal of all offers or discussion of peace, to stifle a popular German demand and to secure continued popular support to undefined war aims. If it could be made to appear that the Allies refused all offers of peace, however reasonable, imperialist forces would be strengthened and liberal forces weakened in Germany. It was and is of the utmost importance to avoid falling into such traps and to turn such occasions to our advantage. Diplomatic mismanagement at such junctures might well result, not in the growing estrangement of the German people from their government, but in their continued support of it, even after defeat, even at the peace table; and might defer for many years that democratization of the German people upon which we depend for ultimate security.

This policy of detaching the enemy peoples from the aims of their governments was forecast by the President on entering the war. The differentiation which he then made between the German people and the German government was not a mere piece of political sentimentalism. It was the indication of a definite policy based upon the recognition of certain fundamental facts of our problem—as that, though an army can be destroyed, a people cannot; that durable peace can never be obtained, whatever the measure of our military success, so long as the German people support their government, which they will continue to do so long as they believe that our policy threatens them. This truth has become increasingly plain of late to some of the alertest minds in the Allied countries of Europe; and the fact that upon the "conversion" of the German people themselves depends our only hope of real security has been stated recently quite vigorously by Mr. Balfour. In the circumstances of America's entrance into the war, it was the aspect of Allied policy particularly incumbent upon her to emphasize.

Such a policy has not implied in the past, nor need it imply in the future, the premature opening of peace negotiations with the enemy in the accepted sense of the term. Nor does it necessarily imply an early peace; it is quite compatible, indeed, with a very prolonged war. Nor does it exclude the conviction that complete defeat of the German armies, a military decision, may be necessary. It merely implies that we should not unnecessarily increase the difficulty of the military task—conceivably impose upon it an impossible burden—by political mismanagement. It implies that though a military decision may be indispensable, that of itself is not enough, since bad politics may rob us of the results which the soldier's work might otherwise give to us.

Now this policy of strengthening military action by sound political strategy and of being prepared properly to use our victory to sound political ends is constantly being interpreted by certain critics of The New Republic as a proposal to abandon military action altogether, and to accept defeat at the hands of the enemy. The plea for a form of peace that shall be just and durable is interpreted as a plea for an early or "German" peace; the plea that we shall meet German peace manoeuvres by a strategy that shall play our game instead of the enemy's is represented as a demand for peace negotiations that shall end the war; the plea for increasing clarity of statement of terms is represented as a demand for the meeting of the Peace Conference.

At the bottom of this monstrous distortion—in so far as it is not intentional—seems to be a childish confusion between what is indispensable and what is sufficient. Insistence upon the quite obvious truth that though the energetic prosecution of the war is indispensable it is not enough, is interpreted as meaning that the war should not be prosecuted! The confusion has resulted in the setting up of an utterly false antithesis. The issue has been made to appear as a choice between one of two mutually exclusive policies: going on with the war with blank refusal to state any terms or discuss anything whatsoever, or, the opening immediately of negotiations with the enemy for peace on any terms whatsoever. In the terms of the first thesis, defeat will of itself solve all the problems and could never give any result but the desired one; any such step as a statement of terms must paralyze the military arm.

Not alone in popular papers, writing down to what they take to be the intelligence of their readers, does one find this attitude. In the conversation even of educated and otherwise intelligent folk one may not infrequently hear a plea for greater clarification of aims met with the retort: "Nothing

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

but the destruction of German military power will destroy the danger of German aggression"—as though that answered the argument for the necessity of certain other things as well; as though defeat of Germany would be all sufficient, equivalent to complete solution of the problem and could never be misused. Whereas obviously it is not our victory which will destroy the danger of German militarism, but our proper use of that victory. After all, history is not without examples of victories that have been ill used; that have resulted in the disintegration of the military alliances that won them. And it is not unimaginable that the Allies might so use theirs as to push or allow Russia to drift into the arms of Germany; or, it may be, certain of the other Allies into those of Austria; or in the alienation from the Allied cause of present European neutrals; or in the imposition of conditions that of very necessity would so weld and consolidate the Teutonic allies as to make them at no distant date a self-contained, potentially powerful and hostile military unit. Such a victory would not end German militarism.

And it is precisely the sort of confusion with which we are dealing, which may directly tend to such a result. To suspend during a long and bitter war the whole habit of disentangling issues, the submergence of the temper which makes discussion possible, will not produce at the peace discerning or patient participants or a state of feeling in which issues and their relative significance can be clearly recognized.

It creates moreover another danger, which is becoming increasingly visible, the demand for peace at any price. The natural corollary to the fallacy that the only possible kind of war is a war without policy or defined aim is the fallacy that no war can be depended upon to achieve a given aim; that even when aims are formulated at its inception they will be obscured and submerged during its course. And from that is but a step to the conclusion that, bad as the early peace may be, the later one, even though more "victorious," may be worse still from the point of view of security and permanence. Thus does one false absolute create an opposing one. If one is disposed to dismiss the danger to Allied solidarity from such a cause, let him measure the weight of anti-governmental Socialism in England, France and Italy before the Stockholm proposals for a conference, and after the failure of those proposals owing to the action of the respective governments.

One need not have read Mr. Trotter to be aware that in war time certain "hungry emotions" have a clamant insistence which we do not permit them in peace time. It is to the desire to satisfy those hungry emotions that we must look in explanation of the confusions and bitterness which underlie the attitude we are discussing. In war time we all become less and less apt to impose restraint upon feeling in favor of thought; we like the issues to be such that our feelings can decide them for us, and sweep away all the distressing complexities, the responsibilities and uncertainties of a reasoned process. It is an immense relief to have our country's cause reduced to the emotional simplicities of a ball-game. And very many will defend this surrender to impulse as a healthy assertion of the instinct of gregariousness and collective self-preservation. But nothing is in fact more false, when we come to social relations, than the assumption that gregariousness, or the "instinct of self-preservation," necessarily makes for preservation at all. Put it to the test of a cry of fire in a crowded theatre. The instinct, the uncontrollable instinct with very many, is to act in a way which will inevitably destroy them. Their salvation will depend upon their rational and disciplined control of "the instinct of self-preservation." Those who would deem that those instincts behind the confusions and criticisms just dealt with will necessarily make for national preservation because they happen to be "natural" and "healthy," had better recall the fact that the exit from the theatre in which we now find ourselves is going to be a very difficult one to manage.

Woman Suffrage in Wartime

IF this country had been at war six years instead of six months women would be voting in all the States of the Union. If the country had been at war for three years New York would be certain to vote for suffrage week after next. Suffering and self-sacrifice bring people to a sense of their common humanity, and decrease the antagonisms of politics, religion and sex.

Even now suffrage has a good chance of success in New York. But the voters must use their imaginations. They must realize that it is only when a nation is just entering a war, and before blood and money have actually been spent, that the purely military ideal dominates all others. At first, service on the firing-line so completely takes possession of many imaginations that no other seems worth considering. To them the suggestion that women are necessary or even helpful in prosecuting war is actually repugnant. Last spring an officer of high rank in our army told the head of a great organization of women that the only war service women could render was by recruiting. "Not," he added, "that they will get any recruits, but if they are pretty they may get some useful publicity."

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Combined, however, with contempt for women's services at the outbreak of war goes a very real desire to protect women's weakness. War vivifies at first man's chivalry toward his own women; but this does not mean a favorable disposition toward the self-governing rights of women in general. It may mean the contrary. Twenty-odd years ago Mr. Root's chief argument against woman suffrage was his own unwillingness to give up his right to protect the women he loved and respected—without the least consideration for the mass of womenkind, less adequately championed. It may seem strange that the early stages of war, when men are preparing to lay down their lives for the protection of their homes, is the one time when legislation protecting women and children is the most difficult to pass, and the easiest to repeal. The truth is that chivalry is a matter of individual relation, and has never been felt, by even the most knightly men, toward women in the bulk. You are chivalrous toward a wife or daughter, but to your factory hands you are fair, on the level, or merely in conformity with the factory laws. On a general question like suffrage, women should not hope great things from a wartime increase in chivalry.

But chivalry is not the only emotion roused by war. The desire to dominate is an essential part of the military spirit, and when this fails to find its legitimate outlet in military service, it is repressed and turned back into civil and domestic life. Many old men and men physically unfit, who feel themselves humiliated by the position of non-combatants, get some compensation by keeping women, at least, upon a lower plane of citizenship than themselves. They feel that by voting No to any feminine plea for equality they are somehow vindicating their virility.

None of the feelings aroused in men by the outbreak of war will increase the vote for suffrage in New York. But it may be increased by imagination, or just by looking at what has happened in Europe, which has passed through the phase that we are in now. At the beginning of the war English women met this difficulty in getting their services accepted by their government: the conviction that a world at war must be entirely ordered and served by men. But as the war went on it turned out to be a matter not only of masculine heroism but of national organization, the emotions of domination began to die down, and the emotions of union and coöperation began to rise. The result of this change may be seen today. Our Allies are rapidly enfranchising women. Canada has given them the vote in six provinces and a federal bill is now to be introduced, Russia has given full suffrage, the French Chamber has accepted a favorable report on municipal suffrage, the British government is behind the bill which has already passed the House of Commons. In spite of certain statesmen, who seem as much surprised to discover patriotism in women as affection in fishes, it is clear that this enfranchisement is being given not as a reward, but as a spontaneous expression of national unity. In this country we ought not to be astonished that the expression has taken this form, for it was just this spirit that enfranchised the women of our first suffrage state, Wyoming, where men and women had taken the same risks and endured the same hardships as pioneers.

This sense of comradeship always comes from suffering and toiling together. If New York men fail to give women the vote on November 6th, it will not be because we are at war, but because we have not been at war long enough to understand what it really means. What it means, in a nation as thoroughly energized as, for example, Great Britain, is intense coöperative effort on the largest scale. Arbitrarily to draw the line at voting, at a time when every man and woman must share in this effort, becomes an absurd anomaly. The conviction spreads that it is irrational to keep women disfranchised when their work has grown more obviously necessary than ever before to the continued existence of the nation. New York women will do their share in the war, and will suffer more than their share, whether the vote is given or withheld. But the men of New York, if they will look forward ever so little, or if they will merely look across the Atlantic, will realize that national unity must fall short of completeness so long as women are told that in just one form of activity possible to them, voting, they are deemed incompetent. Such a judgment, especially in wartime, would class voting with fighting as a function reserved for the physically strong.

The New
REPUBLIC
A Journal of Opinion

PUBLISHED WEEKLY AND COPYRIGHT, 1917, IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BY THE REPUBLIC PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC., 421 WEST TWENTY-FIRST STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. HERBERT CROLY, PRESIDENT, ROBERT HALLOWELL, TREASURER.

EDITORS
HERBERT CROLY — FRANCIS HACKETT
PHILIP LITTELL — ALVIN JOHNSON
GEORGE SOULE—Assistant Editor
CHARLES MERZ, Washington Representative

YEARLY SUBSCRIPTION FIFTY-TWO ISSUES, FOUR DOLLARS IN ADVANCE. SINGLE COPIES TEN CENTS. CANADIAN SUBSCRIPTION FOUR DOLLARS AND FIFTY CENTS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE. FOREIGN SUBSCRIPTIONS FOR COUNTRIES IN THE POSTAL UNION, FIVE DOLLARS PER YEAR IN ADVANCE: REMITTANCE TO BE MADE BY INTERNATIONAL POSTAL MONEY ORDER.

ENTERED AS SECOND CLASS MATTER, NOVEMBER 6, 1914, AT THE POST OFFICE AT NEW YORK, N. Y., UNDER THE ACT OF MARCH 3, 1879.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"The Menace of Maximalism"

THE British press has begun to occupy itself seriously with what the London Times calls "The Ferment of Revolution" in England, the appearance of a Socialist "maximalism," that has become, that paper tells us, a national danger. A policy of severe repression is being called for by certain sections of the British public, just as in this country there is already a growing demand for similar measures against Socialist and radical agitation and the organizations and persons that have been carrying it on. France and Italy have gone through similar experiences. Evidently the problem involved is common to the western democracies. But it is one that might well become more menacing in this country than in any. It is worth while therefore to attempt to understand something of the forces which underlie this phenomenon of "maximalism" in so far as they have been revealed during the last year or two in western Europe, where conditions are more nearly parallel to American than are, for instance, those of Russia.

Two main questions suggest themselves in this connection. Why should the radical, the thoroughgoing social reformer, the protagonist of popular right and of democracy, be anti-war at all? Why should these, of all people, be less alive than others to the danger of world domination by a power, which is the most anti-popular, anti-radical and autocratic in the world, and the triumph of which would render the success of the radical millennium impossible? On the face of it, it would seem that it is precisely the revolutionary Socialist who should be most concerned in the destruction of the most anti-revolutionary force of Christendom.

The second question that arises is, Why should the influence of these minorities, quite negligible in peace times when given full rein, become a national danger just when national solidarity is strongest and the national will most resolute, as is the case in war time?

Usually these questions are not answered by either party to the discussion in any way that is at all convincing. The explanation implied in the prevailing attitude to "treason," namely, that these anti-militarists and radicals definitely desire the triumph of German militarism and autocracy and are facing popular hostility—to say nothing of legal penalties—in order to work for the complete defeat of their own cause by the subjugation of their country to the Prussian conqueror, is so silly that it would never be advanced if it had to be clearly formulated. Yet that and nothing else is the plain implication of most of the denunciation of minority opinion. On the other hand the Socialist proposition that the war is a capitalist plot, engineered by Wall Street for the special interests of a little group of financiers, will hardly bear more examination. American capitalism would have done immensely better with America as a neutral, which meant uncontrolled profits, than with America as a belligerent fixing prices and—introducing state Socialism.

For it is one of the contradictions of the situation that this war, towards which the extremer social reformers and Socialists as a body are so cold, has accomplished over-night, as it were, a development of Socialism which mere agitation would not have accomplished in half a century. And, a further contradiction, towards that development neither capitalism nor imperialism has shown itself particularly hostile. Yet the revolutionary movement among Socialists is growing apace.

Such a situation shows very clearly that the old lines of cleavage, which would put individualist capitalism as representing the bourgeois or privileged classes on the one side, and state Socialism, as representing popular aspiration and democratic reform on the other, have all but completely disappeared. Germany herself, indeed, had taught that before the war. State Socialism, a widespread "nationalization" of the means of production and distribution, are not measures which Prussian autocracy resisted. They were made in many ways a means of buttressing the Prussian ideal of the state as an all-powerful, omnipresent authority disposing alike of the minds and bodies of those from whom it exacted unqualified allegiance; a very powerful means of resisting the political and moral democratization of the German people. And now also in Great Britain certain "advanced" forms of Socialism—a development of "nationalization" which would, for instance, vest in the imperial government the title to all land in certain of the African colonies and work it as an imperial property—has become the policy of the most reactionary groups of British imperialists. They have quickly realized the natural affinity between military imperialism and a certain form of state Socialism.

One may still hear a public orator refer to the industrial and social triumphs which the workers owe to the war. But no one who knows anything of the spirit which has been so rife in the British and French workshops under governmental control during the last two years will make the mistake of assuming that the workers regard their position as an improvement upon that which existed before

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the war, despite the increase of wages which in most cases, and the very considerable increase in some, has taken place. The very grave unrest, which the utmost efforts of the governments and the most urgent appeals to the patriotism of the workers barely manage to subdue, tells more nearly the workers' view on that point.

The story might have been different of course if the habituation to state control, to workshop regimentation on military lines, to the system of leaving-certificates, tribunals and the like, had been more gradual, if it had been spread over thirty instead of three years. As it is, there has grown up, side by side with the resentment against capitalism as represented by the "profiteer," an equal resentment against the bureaucratic state which has replaced the individual employer, or rather, in many cases, made a government official out of him and given him greater powers than ever. The worker still finds himself a "wage slave." But whereas before he had at least some choice of employers, some freedom of movement, could leave one job and go to another, could resent the tyranny of a foreman by downing tools, he finds, or has often found, that under the state he cannot leave, that this is an employer who can punish insubordination with death, by sending or returning a man to the army, and is one against whom it is treason to strike. And the "state," he finds, is really a new name for the old employer. The self-same "master" for whom he worked originally has now become a government official, backed with all the forces of the government. And yet he was led to believe—his own Socialist philosophers had told him—that under such a system the workers would at last be themselves the masters and come into their own!

By tens and hundreds of thousands he has ceased to believe it. And all the contrivances so far devised by his unions or the government to give him some measure of control in the workshops have failed to remove his feeling that more and more he is becoming the helpless puppet of forces outside his control; that he is practically powerless in the grip of a machine too vast, too distant, too all-embracing for him to check or deflect; that the erstwhile employer is close to it, while he himself is remote from it. And the growth of powers in the state has synchronized with a decline in the moral authority of its government. He has seen it attacked violently for incompetence and even deliberate deception and corruption, and its personnel changed and changed again at the instigation of the very nationalists and patriots who tell him that it is his duty to submit to it and accept its decisions and dictates without question.

For these reasons there has grown up naturally in the minds of very many a divided sovereignty and a divided loyalty. The worker has undoubtedly come to feel that the sovereignty of the state should be limited by the power of organizations nearer to himself—an attitude analogous to that which prompted the Russian workman to create a coördinate authority in his Soldiers' and Workmen's Councils. From this feeling has come undoubtedly the growth of guild socialism to which so many observers of working class opinion in England have recently testified. English "maximalist" programs seem to indicate a hope that the trade unions, reconstructed for the purpose, may serve as the basis of the "guilds." One program calls for the substitution of the House of Lords by an Industrial Second Chamber, based not upon the representation of geographical areas but of callings and occupations through their technical and occupational organizations; and calls also for "ownership by the state and management by the workers" as a general formula, illustrated in the case of the railroads by the demand that they be confiscated and leased to the unions who shall work them. To dismiss such programs, as too wild and remote from possibilities to affect in any appreciable degree working class opinion, is to reveal a failure to grasp the effect which certain outstanding facts of the war, economic and moral, have had on that opinion.

What are those facts?

The war has shown that by coördinated and centralized action the whole economic structure can without disaster be altered to a degree that before the war no economist would have supposed possible. We have witnessed economic miracles. With something like half the workers, and that half the best, drawn from production, the remainder cannot only maintain the life of the country at a standard which is materially better on the whole than that which obtained before the war, but they can supply the vast quantity of material needed for the war itself. An obvious conclusion is that if the present workers, instead of being engaged upon the production of mountains of shells and war material, to be immediately destroyed, were engaged upon the production of things which made for the common welfare; and if to that source of increase were added the labor of those now under arms, the amount of wealth available for distribution, if properly distributed, would create a standard of living in the country so different in degree from the old as to be different in kind. And however one may qualify this survey of the outstanding economic fact of the war (and the point is not its exactitude but the extent to which its plausibility has influenced working class opinion), it is universally admitted that before the war no economist

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

would have pronounced what has actually occurred as possible. The experts were all wrong.

To the effect of this astonishing fact on the minds of the more intelligent workers, we have to add the psychological effects of the sudden introduction of conscription into Britain, effects which the institution may not have had in continental countries, for the simple reason that in them its introduction has been for the most part a process extending over generations. Gradual habituation will lead us to accept almost any situation without much vivid questioning. In England, conscription came upon the people without historical preparation, and not, incidentally, by selective draft and with generous exemptions. It was an institution they had always looked upon as alien, and one which they boasted "Englishmen would never stand." Under it, a whole generation of young Englishmen were suddenly confronted with the fact that their lives did not belong to themselves; that each owed his life to the state. Then what did the state owe to him? And if he must give, or at least risk, everything that he possessed to life itself, were others giving or risking what they possessed? Here was new light on the institution of private property. If the life of each belongs to the community, then assuredly does his property.

For great masses of the British working classes conscription has solved the ethical problem involved in the confiscation of capital. The eighth commandment no longer stands in the way as it stood so long in the case of a people still religiously minded and still feeling the weight of Puritan tradition. We have already had the demand from very powerful labor leaders for the confiscation outright, without compensation ("save for a generous provision against individual hardship") of railways, mines, shipping and public utilities generally.

And to these two results—the conviction that governmental action can make economic adjustments of a much wider scope than we supposed, and the conviction of the moral justification of confiscation—must be added a third: the determination in future to be adventurous and experimental in social reform.

When the English "maximalist" is told, as of course the economists will tell him, that his programs will fail, his relation to some years of war experience prompts him to take the line: "Suppose it does fail, and we have to try something else? Will it cost ten million lives, the youth of a whole generation, like the war?" He has seen certain military enterprises utterly fail, enterprises which he knew were considered gambles by those who ordered them, and which in fact were afterwards condemned officially as errors. Yet those who, in the circumstances perhaps rightly, ordered those gambles knew they would cost dreadful suffering, unimaginable horrors, innumerable lives. When therefore he is told that his industrial experiment will disturb credit and upset trade, he will be quite unimpressed. He will certainly take the risk. He will introduce a little of the strenuousness and adventure of war into the life of peace, and make it a little less "soft and slothful."

But the question remains why these people, fired with the vision of a complete democracy in the future, should be cold or hostile to a war that must be won if the world is to be safe for democracy. Most radicals and democrats in England and France would of course deny either coldness or hostility to the aim of defeating German militarism, and would point out that what they want is not a relaxing of the efforts to win the war but an increase of the efforts to ensure its democratic outcome. They point to certain tendencies as proof that the democracies may find themselves at the end of a long war, not only having failed to destroy militarism and autocracy abroad, but having succeeded in firmly establishing both at home; or that even complete military victory may result in exchanging the pre-bellum condition in which those things were a menace to democracy for one in which they have become an established fact by virtue of the arrival to power of reactionary elements and that elimination of more liberal ones which war so often produces.

Now the monstrous suggestion that the complete victory of the Allies will result, in Allied countries, in a grave setback of liberal and democratic tendencies, does not come merely, or mainly, from the "maximalists" at all, but from the exceedingly patriotic and pro-war conservatives, imperialists, protectionists, clericals and reactionaries generally of Britain, France and Italy. Nothing, perhaps, gives the sincere democrat, who has supported this war as the price which the western democracies must pay for their liberation, more uneasiness than the fact that its most earnest advocates are those who have consistently represented the anti-democratic forces in European politics, who have always denied that democratic government, peace, liberalism, internationalism, are desirable things. Yet it is those things for which the war they so ardently support is being waged. The "maximalist" is able to point out that if in Italy you take the imperialists and the militarists of the most extravagent type, or in France the royalists, nationalists and anti-parliamentarians, in Britain the tariffists, the backwoods Tories, you will find them stridently rejoicing, through, for instance, their newspaper organs, that, whatever else the war does, it will "once for all put an end to the poisonous doctrines of internationalism, pacifism, free trade, socialism and democ-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

racy," as a certain London daily recently expressed it. These reactionaries see in the war, not only a means of national defense, but a means by which they hope to realize the triumph of their political doctrines.

And they are certainly entitled to point out that their intuition has at least this temporary justification: their influence in every country has become immeasurably greater since the beginning of the war. The radical not unnaturally asks what sort of peace is likely to result if that influence increases. Is it, he is apt to ask, a democratic peace that will come from the government and diplomacy of Milners, Curzons, Balfours, Ribots and Poincarés from which the liberal elements have been expelled? And if he admits a risk to the democracy of the world in a too early cessation of the war, so also he sees a risk in its prolongation.

This is not an attempt to estimate which intuition comes nearer to the truth, both as they have been expressed being probably wrong, but only to suggest that if anti-democratic intuitions prompt support of the war we cannot be altogether surprised that democratic intuitions prompt sometimes a critical attitude towards it. Nor is this an attempt to indicate how the "menace of maximalism" should be met. It is an attempt merely to analyze some of its outstanding factors and to enumerate its outstanding arguments, without, be it noted well, any necessary subscription, on the part of the present reporter, to the validity of those arguments.

NORMAN ANGELL.

The Value of Time in the War

This article is contributed by a French officer connected with staff work on the western front.

THE aim which the Allies have before them is to impose peace on the enemy. Good sense as well as military art dictates that in order to beat the enemy they must concentrate against Germany the maximum of their strength. Although the old principle of warfare: "Strike hard and all together," is very simple, as all principles are, its application in a world war becomes difficult and complicated; difficult because a coalition lacks the single direction which is so necessary to the most efficient conduct of the war, complicated because the multiplicity of the fronts and the varying interests sometime make it difficult to see the campaign as a whole, and to remember that the highest interest of the coalition is the sole consideration which should determine all of its acts.

The Allies have a superiority in men, in money and material. Theoretically this superiority ought to suffice to win the war. In fact it was but slowly and incompletely utilized, and because of this the war is still being waged. It is very often forgotten that numbers are only the raw material of military force and have no value in war except when trained, marshalled on the field of battle and provided with the necessary material. We are not fighting today against men without material, but against men and material. Other things being equal, success depends on the judicious use of technical means. This takes for granted the fact that these means have been created, and that the troops have had time to learn to use them.

The dates upon which the Allied armies arrived on the field, one after the other, were determined by the date at which each nation entered the war, and by the different degrees of preparation of the peaceable democracies, which had not armed beyond the strict limits of their defensive necessities. The enemy has taken advantage of this temporary weakness by striving to prolong and emphasize it, i.e., by dividing the Allied forces in space and time. The sole protection which Germany has against defeat lies in the difficulty which the Allies experience—if not in conceiving at least in arranging and carrying out an offensive all together. The time which each one of them has necessarily consumed in preparing his army has saved the enemy until today. By reducing this time to the indispensable minimum the Allies are still able to conquer. Such is the truism which more than three years of war have brought to light.

In 1914 the French army, helped only by the small and brave British army, found itself exposed to the attack of three quarters of the German forces. It succeeded with the help of its ally in breaking the German offensive in the open warfare at the battles of the Marne and the Yser; but the lack of material and munitions still more than the exhaustion of the troops prevented it from transforming the battle of the Marne into a decisive victory which would terminate the war. Months were necessary to produce the material suitable for the new trench warfare and to learn to use it both on the defensive and offensive. It was during this period and through lack of material that the French army suffered its heaviest losses. In trench warfare the same results can be obtained with as without losses, provided skilful use is made of technical means. Losses actually decrease in proportion as material and instruction are perfected.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Hence every new nation which enters the war and desires to economize the loss of its youngest and hardiest men must make a supreme effort to attain its maximum production from the very beginning and to instruct its army in the firmest and most competent manner. A government has no more essential duty than to plan all measures towards decreasing the losses in human life. In no case must the mistakes made by the others be repeated. They proved far too costly. The living must learn their lesson from the dead and apply it without useless discussion and harmful loss of time. In this particular, America is fortunately benefiting from the experience of the Allies and from their production of war material, especially that of France.

But America in return must furnish France with the raw material necessary both to consolidate the French front in the shelter of which the American army is forming, to supply the American troops with the requisite war material, and finally to prepare the general offensive as soon as possible. This supply is of the most urgent nature, which from the American point of view alone should receive the most careful attention from the government. In this connection every delay compromises the future.

In 1915 England equipped and trained an army of constantly increasing military value. This army, however, was not fully prepared for a major offensive and was only able to carry out two local but very vigorous attacks at Neuve Chapelle in March and at Loos in September. At the same time the French army was more completely equipped and instructed, but still was limited in the expanse of the front which it could attack through the quantity of material at its disposal. Nevertheless, for the first time, it broke the German line on May 9th in Artois, but on a scale which, unfortunately, was so limited that its success could not be followed up.

It carried out in September a double offensive on a large radius in Champagne and Artois. The tactical results were very important in respect to the number of prisoners taken, the war material captured and the area of ground conquered. But the impossibility of taking any decisive strategic advantage from these results proved that it was necessary to increase still further the material weight of attack and to unite the combined French and English forces in a more powerful offensive. It was, however, proved that the offensive power of the French army during a specified time was superior to the defensive power of the Germans. The methods of fighting in trench warfare had been settled. It remained to apply them.

The Allies planned a very powerful offensive for 1916. The enemy, who could easily guess this and who dreaded it above everything, did what the art of war enjoins in a similar case. He tried to stop it or break its force by a preventive offensive at Verdun against the army which was ready first and the more formidable—the French army. If they had attacked the British army which was ready to defend itself but not to attack, they would have had the whole French army, ready for the attack, on their hands. In attacking the French army, they knew that the British army could not come to the aid of the Allies until after a certain period. In fact this delay lasted four months and it was not until July 1st that the Anglo-French troops could undertake a general offensive on the Somme.

Doubtless Verdun cost the Germans very dearly and ended their offensive power in trench warfare. But history will perhaps record that their enormous sacrifices saved them in 1916 from an irremediable defeat. For the battle of Verdun diminished the power of the French offensive on the Somme and yet this offensive put the Germans in a very critical situation, as was confessed by the German staff itself. It is not possible to estimate the comparative force which is to be attributed to the two factors that determined the actual results of the battle of the Somme—the weakening of the French offensive power and the decrease in the German power of resistance, both emanating from the preliminary wearing-down of the two armies at Verdun. We can only keep to facts, for only facts count in war. What can be safely said is this: the difference in the degree of preparation for offensive operations of the two great English and French armies permitted the enemy to take an initiative which very considerably hampered the subsequent operations of the Allies.

Instructed by the preceding events, the Allies should have been in a position to undertake in 1917 for the first time an offensive with all the powers at their disposal. An unforeseen political event, the Russian revolution, changed the situation completely. The maintenance of the old régime might perhaps have been worse from the military standpoint alone. Our purpose here is simply to state a fact: The internal situation of Russia saved Germany from a position which might perhaps have been desperate at the present moment.

We have entered into this argument not for the purpose of reproaching the Allied nations for the time consumed by their preparation or to complain of the consequence of political events which are beyond the control of man, and which may contribute to the ultimate attainment of better social conditions. We simply seek to draw from the facts themselves certain justifiable inferences in regard to

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the conduct of the war and the value of time in present warfare.

From a military point of view Germany appears to have reached her maximum effort. She had a program calling for the creation of new divisions in two series. At the end of 1916 and at the beginning of 1917 she was able to create the first series of twenty-seven divisions, twenty-six of which appeared in France. But she was unable to organize the second series of ten divisions. Three only could be formed. Several regiments were disintegrated in order to strengthen the front and for the first time since the beginning of the war a clear decrease in the total numbers of the German army was recorded on July 1st. At the moment when her total strength began to diminish in spite of the calling up of the 1919 class, Germany found herself obliged to increase the number of her reserves on the French front up to forty divisions with the sole object in view of allowing the troops to be sufficiently relieved. She still has considerable capacity for resistance, but her available forces are diminishing at the very moment when the military situation—daily growing more and more serious for her on the western front—demands their increase.

On the other hand the numerical and material superiority of the Allies is theoretically growing, but it is still practically subject to fluctuations which may modify it considerably, for example, the disuse in 1917 of the greater part of the Russian troops. Only on the western front where the American forces are called upon to enter into line is there any assurance of a successful offensive. It is supremely necessary that they do not tarry in taking up their position, in order that this requisite increase to our numerical superiority may be obtained before the unknown limit of the way is reached. Precisely because there is a limit to the duration of this mad war and because this limit is unknown, it is the business of the United States to assure to the Allies at the earliest possible moment the superiority which is necessary to them to bring about a victorious ending to the long struggle.

From a political point of view, suffice it to remember that the duration of the war and its indefinite extension opens to Germany the opportunity of a new political offensive as dangerous as the old military offensive. Germany builds all the more hope on this political offensive because she attacks thereby the nations which have been most tried by the war.

From an economic and financial standpoint, the resources of the Allies are superior to those of the enemy, but the enemy has been able of late to obtain fresh supplies. Thus while we cannot estimate with any exactness the limit of resistance of the German people from an economic point of view, do not let us forget that the resources of the Allies are also being used up and that even if the submarine campaign is powerless to change their plans, it involves them in more and more expense.

In a word, Germany is able to prolong the war just in proportion to the time which the Allies need in order to prepare their attacking troops. How can we shorten this time in order to obtain a more efficient utilization of our numerical superiority and consequently a more rapid conclusion of the war? This is the question which must be answered definitely by both governments and civilians. There are two methods to be employed simultaneously:

1. Never lose time (and this simple rule, if it is applied, is worth in itself an army).

2. Gain time (and this is always possible).

1. Never lose time. This means the making, without any delay whatsoever, of the decisions which the experience of the war shows to be necessary or simply useful. It means the cutting short of all discussions, remembering that there is nothing absolute in warfare, that no perfect solution can be found and that the best is always the quickest, provided that it presents more advantages than inconveniences. It means that every decision should be immediately carried out by the responsible heads, which necessitates the preliminary appointing of these heads in every branch of national activity relating to the war. In a word it means trying to do well before trying to do better.

2. To gain time. This means shortening to the utmost the time originally appropriated to the work of preparations. It means that each individual, man or woman, should spare no efforts to augment the results of the intellectual or physical activity consecrated to their country. It means doing better after having done well.

On what does victory depend today? Who can say that it does not depend on a steamer requisitioned eight days earlier—on one shell or one cannon more, on a yard of material, a stroke of the pen, a hammer blow? On anything and everything which expresses the wish to produce more. It depends, that is, chiefly on the acceleration of the collection of individual activities through which the will of the nation is expressed, a nation which is in a more favorable position than any other, by reason of her past and her situation in the world, to preserve the clear vision of the general interest of humanity and the Allies combined.

Time works for those who use it best and success, whenever it comes, will be all the more complete the sooner it is assured. At the present moment, the only thing that can compromise it is a loss of time.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Après la Guerre

MANY phrases of deep significance to soldiers have arisen during the war. In some cases the mere expression of It's a long way to Tipperary betrays an entire frame of mind, in which homesickness is not the least factor. The French poilu says continually *C'est la guerre,* indicating his stoical acceptance of whatever discomfort or fate may come to him or his comrades. There is another phrase which one hears continually in the French army. No doubt its equivalent is much used in all armies. It is *après la guerre.* To introduce this phrase or its English equivalent, "After the war," into a conversation is to awaken the hope that remains for the future. Sometimes it kindles the light in the eyes, as the hearer thinks of the magical period at home to come some day. And very frequently it brings to expression plans for the future which cannot fail to be of interest to Americans.

It has been my habit for several months to inquire of each chance acquaintance as to his plans for *après la guerre.* With surprising frequency the response has indicated an intention to go to America at the earliest possible opportunity. In some cases the intention is inspired by the mere desire to travel for pleasure; more frequently it has its origin, frankly, in an economic motive. If circumstances permit, it means very probably that there will be a great emigration from southern Europe to the United States immediately after the great war.

The desire to go back to America is so intense as to be almost painful in the case of the soldiers who have returned to Europe to participate in the struggle. In Marseilles I met a French private in whose mind the thought of going back to the United States remained uppermost throughout an afternoon—it amounted almost to an *idée fixe.* Time after time our conversation would recur to that subject, and nothing that I could say about the beauty of France, the grandeur of Paris, or the charm of French life would discourage comparisons which were in favor of things American.

"When I go back, I go back to stay," he insisted.

While in an important Mediterranean port of Italy I was literally besieged by Italian civilians who wanted to talk about New York and Philadelphia. Almost unanimously they declared their intention to go to America as soon as possible. Occasionally an old man would admit, half-heartedly, that he had no such desire, but even in such cases there was mention of sons or daughters who had gone or would go. There were numerous inquiries as to immigration regulations. Of course, some of the talk about the United States was merely complimentary, but more often the economic motive was frankly expressed.

"I get big pay in United States. . . . Plenty to eat at New York. . . . I have the fine time in Chicago." And a hundred kindred remarks.

I spent several pleasant evenings in the company of Italian soldiers at a barracks in southern Italy. A surprising number of the men had been to the United States. Many of their less fortunate fellows obviously were well informed. English was commonly spoken, and frequently one was hailed in some such fashion as, "Hello, American, how's things in the States?" The ensuing conversations would bring forth tales of employment in San Francisco, Seattle, Pittsburgh, Buffalo, and scattered cities throughout the country. Always the comparison was made between the small wages paid in Italy (relatively high just at present) and those prevailing in America, and there was much curiosity concerning the present state of the labor market and the wages paid to munitions workers.

One chance acquaintance was an Italian who had owned a barber shop in Boston. As a salesman of barber supplies he had traveled in all parts of the United States, and his eyes were almost tearful as he talked of this city and that.

"I'll be happy when I get back there," he said.

There were several requests for American tobacco, on one occasion from a man who seemed less proud of the fact that he wore the cock's plume of the famous Bersaglieri than of the fact that he had once earned five dollars a day in Buffalo. One night several American lads, en route for the Balkans for service as ambulance drivers, attended an open-air concert rendered by real artists for the time engaged in the work of the war. It was a moonlight night and the setting was as beautiful as any ever pictured in opera or play, yet the romance of the occasion was in no wise diminished by the fact that Italian operatic numbers were supplemented by American ragtime. I think that many of the Italians, genuinely homesick for the "States," have a deeper feeling for East Side ragtime than for the martial music that prevails in sunny Italy. What is a bugle call to one who has turned a hand organ?

Another night a party of American *ambulanciers* got off a French troop train at Rome long enough for a brief excursion, as guests of the American colony, on the streets of Rome. The automobile stopped in front of a famous café to be served with refreshments. In a moment the head waiter came rushing to the street.

"He wants to shake hands with some American boys," announced our host.

The hand-shaking was accomplished enthusi-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

astically, and we learned that our friend was perhaps more homesick for New York, where he had long been employed, than any member of our party.

Quite the same spirit prevailed in Saloniki, in Greece. As soon as the nationality of the American boys was identified, they found themselves meeting on every hand men who had been in or who hoped to go to the United States. Several such individuals proffered services as interpreters and guides, and assisted in the purchase of souvenirs and supplies.

It was a bit strange in the midst of Turkish bazaars to be accosted by a Spanish Jew who was determined to talk of his old home near Fourteenth Street and Broadway, yet such was my experience.

"I am an American," he declared, as though that covered all the faults of his dress and behavior. "I work in automobile factory—sometimes I make furniture. I'm sorry I come back to fight the Turk. No good here now. When can I go back?"

The Spanish Jews, of whom there are nearly fifty thousand in Saloniki—descendants of those who were expelled from Spain by Ferdinand in 1492—seem all to have an eye toward the far country. Several of them proudly exhibited envelopes to prove the residence of relatives in America. At one book store a girl clerk inquired eagerly as to whether I might be acquainted with her fiancé, who it seems, is an employee of Baruch Brothers' store in Los Angeles.

So numerous were the confidences concerning relatives in America and plans to go there that they became monotonous. In fact, several shrewd merchants were suspected of trying to turn their familiarity with St. Louis or Baltimore to commercial account. In self-defense several of the boys were willing to pose as Englishmen, who, of course, are less of a curiosity in the great Allied port.

Away out in the hills of Albania the song is the same. Some years ago seven thousand Albanians were recruited as contract laborers for work near Worcester, Massachusetts. In time most of them drifted back to their native land; not, however, without some wandering about America. Nowadays the cost of living is very high in Albania, and the conditions of life are not too pleasant. What with Senegalese and Annamese and Russians and French and Italians and Serbians and Germans and Austrians and Turks and Bulgarians and a dozen other nationalities camping in the hills, how could it be otherwise! So the thoughts of many turn back to the Land of the Stars and Stripes.

One meets these returned emigrants in the most unexpected places and under the most startling conditions. John the barber in the town of K—— learned his trade at a barber college in Massachusetts, and he brought American chairs back with him. They are the most comfortable seats in all the Balkans. Now he talks continually of Worcester, Mass., and hopes against hope that he may soon be there—wife and family with him.

The only cash registers in town are at the store of a man who feels the same call. In fact, the most modern town of inland Albania owes its progressiveness largely to the presence of men who have traveled abroad, particularly in America. One of these citizens is a baker. In his ovens are baked the huge round loaves of bread that are consumed in the neighborhood. These loaves are kneaded at home before being brought to the bakery, as a measure of fuel conservation. This man, prosperous before the war, began the construction of a two-story stone house. The home is uncompleted, and its owner gladly would sacrifice it if he might return to the United States.

"I would like to go tomorrow," he says.

The other day my ambulance pulled to the side of a mountain road to let a rustic, two-wheeled cart pass by. The driver wore a red fez, a shirt with tail outside the white tights, a tattered jacket, and shoes that ended with pompons on the upturned toes. Of all the men I had ever met he appeared the most foreign. As he passed by, the horse shied at the sound of the motor. The Albanian grinned.

"Scared to death," he said, in good English. Perhaps after the war, he, too, will return to America.

Once I went far back in the hills to a shot-to-pieces village surrounded by barbed wire, in a region infested by *comatajes,* or brigands, to bring out a fever-stricken poilu. My French was insufficient for the delivery of instructions. The sergeant sent a boy away. In two minutes an Albanian hillman, picturesque in his native garb, came to me and offered his hand. He had once been a miner in southwestern Missouri, and in response to my query admitted that he would like to go back.

"Maybe after the war," he added.

Along the streets of one town are numerous crude blacksmith shops where Albanian blacksmiths make ugly hobnails and iron shoes for the donkeys which are used about the country. One of the blacksmiths worked for a long time in the United States. Now, the owner of his own shop, he earns the equivalent of one dollar and a half a day. He recalls the time when he made that sum twice daily and had a fine time spending it.

"You bet I'd like to go back," he confesses.

Recently I went into a barber shop for a haircut and shave. In payment I tendered a five-franc French note. Economic law is at work in Albania, and very little coin is available. So the barber could not furnish me four francs of change. (At

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

least barber's prices remain low here.)

He did not quibble. " Pay me some other time," he said.

" But I may not be here long," I replied.

He thought a minute, then said, smiling:

" Pay me sometime in America."

HARRY W. FRANTZ.

The Price of a Home

II

IT is frequently urged that children bring a new element into the home, that the problems involved in child training are intellectually most stimulating, that they offer a freshness and variety which are adequate for the mental development of the mother. Doubtless there are elements of truth in this argument, yet I wonder if those who press it realize how often a child has to be bathed? Let us admit that the first ministrations of this kind bring the thrill of the mentally fresh and the emotionally pleasurable. But after the act has been repeated several hundred times the thrill refuses to report for duty. Again, how many people have counted the times a mother ties on a child's bib? If, after having tied it on for the three thousandth time, which is only about one half the actual number, she rebels and lets the child eat without it, its dress must be changed and the laundry basket piles high. So she goes back to her bib-tying. If she succeeds in doing this without rebellion she will doubtless be happier. But at best the process has ceased to stimulate her brain. And the vast majority of the acts which must be performed by a mother for her child resemble bib-tying in being acts which soon lose their interest.

Let us summarize the mother's situation. In the first place, the birth of a child causes such a physical strain that the mother is not in a condition to benefit by the mental stimulus she is supposed to be receiving. Secondly, the upbringing of the child involves countless trivial distracting activities which confuse and discourage rather than stimulate mental processes. Again, things in the child which appear interesting to others are lost upon the mother on account of her nearness to the child and her familiarity with it. Finally, so many years must elapse before the outcome of her plans and endeavors can be known that the influence of these upon the mother is likely to wear itself out.

People say that the conditions which formerly restricted the home maker have largely been changed for the better in our day, that much of the detail work has been removed from the home, and that the burden of what remains has been lightened by mechanical invention. This argument looks better than it actually is. Machinery which does the house work has thus far been introduced into comparatively few homes. And who ever heard of a person who had no part in the invention of a machine being mentally stimulated by merely using it? I am inclined to believe that mechanical inventions are proving thought-killers rather than thought-producers, and that the time they save is wasted unless it can be given to activities which have a real mental content.

Women's clubs have done something to supply such activities and will doubtless do more, but would any one say that they provide for women that mental training which we fail to get in the routine of our homes, and which many men do get from their business? How has this difference in the lot of men and women come about? Why is one half of civilized mankind free to come in contact with the new, and so have opportunity for freer development, while the other half is hemmed in and restricted?

From the earliest beginnings of human society the details of living have fallen upon the woman, because her function of bearing and feeding the children made her the more stationary parent. But savage society had fewer details than civilized has. Its women were not isolated. They lived in the open air, for one thing, and whatever opportunities savage society afforded for freshness and newness of experience were almost equally divided between men and women. As the world moved, our civilization has established the separate and stationary home. Convention has declared what must go on there. It does not standardize this work by saying how well things shall be done, but simply says what things shall be done. One by one, under the guise of progress and advancement, the routine duties of the home maker have been multiplied. Whatever the number of her family, the size of her house, her ability to hire help, and so forth, each home maker struggles on, trying to meet all social demands for both herself and her children. If she does not try she will be branded as one of the " odd progressive " kind, and the entire family will suffer from sarcastic criticism. The very pressure and insistence of the demands upon time and brain strength have made impossible that breadth of view which would result in action tending toward a readjustment of conditions. Convention and tradition hold woman to the treadmill of her daily routine, and they are often supported by a grim individual conscience inherited from generations of foremothers whose life made their characters stern.

Are there any conclusions to the matter? It seems to me that, up to the present time, there are none which can in any sense suggest finality. A condition of things which has been growing for so

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

long and which even now is so little understood will be slow to yield to reconstructive influences. There have been some practical attempts to solve the problem. An example of these is coöperative housekeeping which has been tried in many different forms. So far, no very general success has come in this line. What part the traditional narrow training of the home maker has in this failure can only be surmised. Theoretically, at least, the scheme offers attractive possibilities and will doubtless some time contribute to a solution. Individual women are working on the subject. Some of these women, because the pressure is intolerable, are making solutions which meet their own situations. If a fairly large number of these individual solutions could be assembled and organized, the result would form a step towards eventual reconstruction.

The most hopeful phase of the matter is that the problem is being recognized. Prominent educators are beginning to see that, in the broad field of social evolution, here is a portion which has been left out of account. Here is a class of people which is practically unrepresented. Increasing stress is being put upon the value of discovering the meaning of experience. In the occupation of home making, there is a large number of cultured and trained women who cannot attach any inherent meaning to the great bulk of household duties. Many intelligent women avoid the business of home making because they have become aware of its cost. They are thus following a fundamental instinct, which in their cases obtains precedence of the parental instinct. Women who intelligently refuse marriage are following the instinct to retain control of one's environment rather than to be controlled by it.

In the meantime, the intelligent home maker is also feeling a sense of awareness. She recognizes the price she is paying for her home. But she is faithfully paying it and expects to do so to the end, although she loathes her present dominant occupations on account of their lack of intellectual content and any social necessity of a larger sort. To her honor, be it said, she is in revolt. If she is not in revolt, so much the worse for her. It is not that she wishes to avoid the work which the home involves. She would gladly do ten times more, did her strength permit. She is not afraid of the care or the pain which motherhood brings. Oh, how I wish I could proclaim this truth from the house tops! She is in revolt because she knows that through her functions of mother and home maker, she is failing to develop her highest mental and moral activities. She is losing her power to think clearly; to see the relation of what she tries to do to its consequences. As she fails to find meaning in the recurring details of her daily occupations, she gradually finds herself failing to look for the meanings in the larger life of the world.

The present generation of home makers cannot hope to arrive. My most earnest hope and conviction is that through the influence of continued intellectual rebellion on their part against the present conditions, we shall blaze a trail which for our daughters and granddaughters will lead out to a reconstructed society where all individuals shall have equal share in grasp of mind and freedom of spirit.

JULIA CLARK HALLAM.

The War Industries Board

IF the United States were so full of mines, foundries, factories and labor that the supplies of all articles were inexhaustible, purchasing war materials would be comparatively simple. We could have wholly independent quartermaster and ordnance divisions in army, navy and marines; these divisions could be subdivided indefinitely; we could add countless energetic purchasing agents to each subdivision; and we could instruct each agent to buy as much as he could as rapidly as possible, without paying attention to the other agents or to the Emergency Fleet Corporation, the Aircraft Production Board, the British, French, Italian, Russian and Japanese governments, the railroads, the manufacturers of agricultural implements, or anyone else. But the quantity of many essential war supplies is insufficient. We have entered a going war at the height of its activity, a war in which every source is being drained in a race for supremacy in material. We have crowded in with the additional demands created by our own military machine. If our buyers were without coördination the results would be three: first, competitive chaos; second, prohibitive prices; third, the collapse of all buying programs at crucial points.

After price regulation, proper distribution is by far the most vital function in our administrative body. Upon its operation depends not only the success of the War Industries Board, but the success of the shipping program, the success of our Allies' military program, and the military decision. Suppose we raise and equip an army of five million —what good will it be if it has used up so much steel and labor that we can build only enough ships to transport and supply half a million? Suppose we create equipment and transportation for our untrained forces—with the result that the British and French veterans now holding the western front lack ammunition and give way. And these are only the broader questions. We must balance pro-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

duction of machine guns against production of aeroplane motors. If we adopt a motor truck program, we must see that just enough facilities and no more are apportioned to it all the way from machine-tools to tonnage and gasoline. In a war which requires so many specialized fabricated instruments, complex questions of priority must be settled every minute.

Nevertheless we necessarily began the war with numerous competing purchasing divisions, all vigorous and growing. It was natural for General Squier to think only of the need for quartermasters' supplies, to build up his own division and buy, buy, buy, as fast as he could. It was natural for General Crozier, with all his subordinate sections of ordnance, to commission the most able buyers of minerals and guns he could find, and to receive with reluctance admonitions from any quarter to sacrifice his least requirement. The navy has some of the best purchasing bodies in the country; it is proud of them and does not want to delegate control of their work to any outside authority. Mr. Hurley and Admiral Capps understand the tragic need for ships as strongly as we all do; they are determined at all costs to supply it. And the buyers for the Allies insist on more rather than fewer munitions for the millions of soldiers who are now every day and night blasting out the Germans with tons of high explosive shells.

Against this particularist activity the priority organism has made slow headway. It is represented by the War Industries Board, an outgrowth of the Advisory Commission of the Council of National Defense—a body which is itself advisory. Under Mr. Frank Scott, the chairman, and the seven members of the board, is a committee of three: Mr. Baruch, who is in charge of raw materials; Mr. Brookings, who is in charge of fabricated articles; and Judge Lovett, who is chairman of the Priority Committee. All orders of the Allies are placed through these three men. But they have no statutory authority over American requirements. Mr. Baruch's experts and Mr. Brookings's experts are merely consulted by our buyers in cases of emergency, or for aid in certain kinds of goods. Judge Lovett's Priority Committee, and the subsidiary Clearance Committee (subordinate advisers of advisers) have to deal, in coördinating our buying, with men directly connected with the executive. Only one legal mandate, for instance, binds General Crozier to these committees, and that is Secretary Baker's executive order that certain of the ordnance contracts shall be viséd by the committee before being signed. The strongest compulsion to make use of the War Industries Board comes only when the independent purchasing divisions run full speed into a shortage and have to ask for help. It is only this detailed, day-by-day compulsion that really tends to increase the Board's oversight over priority.

The Clearance Committee is composed of representatives from the various American governmental buying bodies. It keeps a list of all supplies in which a shortage appears; and an order for any material in this list must be cleared by the committee before it can be filled. The committee, in passing such an order, consults whatever expert of the board is supposed to know the conditions of the market concerned. If he believes that at the moment the order can be filled, he recommends that it be cleared. If a conflict arises between departments over any particular lot of goods or any particular factory, the Clearance Committee decides it if possible; if not, the conflict is passed up to the Priority Committee. The Clearance Committee thus facilitates the necessary elementary coöperation among departments. It does not foresee; it merely avoids immediate difficulties and discovers tangles when they have arisen. It does not apply any program or policy.

The Priority Committee is composed in a somewhat haphazard manner of two railroad lawyers, an admiral who knows machine tools and an admiral who knows ordnance, a former Quartermaster General of the army, an expert in steel, and an expert in tin cans. It represents neither all the buying divisions nor all the sources of supply, but is a compromise between the two. It is supposed to coördinate the buying programs of all departments, the Allies, and all the railroads and public necessities in private hands, to lay out on that basis policies of priority, to decide the conflicts passed up by the Clearance Committee, and to distribute to manufacturers classified priority certificates showing which orders are to be given precedence. All buyers must apply to it for these certificates, otherwise their orders automatically fall into the lowest class. Here should be the nervous system to regulate our whole producing circulation. Perhaps the Priority Committee understands its vastly important and vastly perplexing function, but few others in Washington or elsewhere do understand it, and in consequence the Committee is not yet accomplishing a small fraction of what it should accomplish.

The Shipping Board, let us say, commandeers ten cranes now nearing completion, for use on a new pier. Three cranes had been ordered by a manufacturer of munitions, so that he could load upon freight cars a consignment of shells for the British government, now nearing completion. The manufacturer protests to Mr. Hurley, who replies by asking if the manufacturer knows any other lot of cranes he can get. Who is in charge of all orders for cranes? No one man. Who knows the crane

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

market thoroughly? No one man. Who knows which is more important at the moment, the shipping of the British shells or the loading of the American ships? The Priority Committee should know, but it contains no representative of the Shipping Board. It is uncertain about the competing programs. Nobody has ever correlated them.

In the first place, if the Priority Committee is to be given a fair chance at its task, the larger outlines of the programs must be laid out and correlated by inter-Allied conferences, including the United States. These programs ought then to be subject to almost daily regulation and adjustment in this country by our own war cabinet—presumably the Council of National Defense. In the second place, the Priority Committee ought to include representatives of all our governmental purchasing or commandeering agencies. In the third place, the committee ought to be able to go for information about actual market conditions not, at present, to experts under Mr. Baruch and Mr. Brookings, but to experts under whose authority all the orders are actually placed. That means that all the government purchasing agencies must be centralized, as those of the Allies now are, under the War Industries Board.

Let us pass over the first requirement, noting by the way that it would imply a reorganization of the Council of National Defense as a war cabinet with power, including in its membership the head of the War Industries Board. The second requirement means merely a merger of the Priority Committee and the Clearance Committee. The third requirement means the changing of the War Industries Board from an advisory body to an executive, producing organization, with power to make contracts. That, in Washington, is an almost revolutionary suggestion.

With these three changes we should have an organization parallel to the British Ministry of Munitions, but more complete, because the British Admiralty still insists on doing its own buying. It would not necessitate, however, the abolishing of all the admirable purchasing staffs now under the various departments. It would involve no change in personnel. All that would be necessary would be to transfer the power of closing contracts from the present division chiefs to the War Industries Board, and to connect the purchasing staffs more closely with the experts of the board. When the ordnance division, for instance, had negotiated a contract for guns, the contract would be given for signature, not to General Crozier, but to the steel controller who also had to sign contracts for the Shipping Board and the navy and the Allied governments, and who in this capacity conferred frequently with the Priority Committee. Through him the committee would be guided in the issuance of its certificates. No advantage of the present system would be sacrificed, except the advantage of those agencies which through more energetic buying are able to further their own programs irrationally at the expense of others.

Opposition to this plan comes from some army and navy officers who, as is natural, have been reluctant to allow the encroachments already made by an upstart civilian organization upon their exclusive jurisdictions. It comes from a few producers who prefer through habit to deal directly with the departments. It comes from congressmen who are afraid of graft if any man who has been connected with big business is allowed to place a contract. It comes from those who do not believe in the capability of the present War Industries Board to handle so big a job. Yet, sooner or later, unless we are to lose the war by chaos in our production, some such centralization will be attained. Every day natural forces are pressing us towards it. All informed observers agree that the tendency is irresistible. The only difference of opinion is as to the length to which it must go, and as to how quickly the process can with wisdom be completed. "The War Industries Board," said one disgusted official, "was born in cowardice, it lives in compromise, and it will die in disgrace." That phrase may be too bitter. Yet one thing is sure—either the War Industries Board must soon develop more power, or it must collapse and give place to some other board created for the same purpose. And every day that the development is delayed means effort misdirected and victory postponed.

GEORGE SOULE.

CORRESPONDENCE

Mr. Hillquit for Mayor

SIR: In the interests of fair play and a well informed political opinion we beg, on behalf of the Collegiate League for Hillquit, the opportunity of presenting the case for Mr. Hillquit's election as mayor in the columns of The New Republic.

We make our appeal frankly to the independent and progressive voter, who is opposed to Tammany and all its works, and desires a wise application of public ownership to the destruction of profiteering, and to him who hates above everything else political to "throw away his vote."

We need not rehearse at length the evidence that has been accumulating to prove that Mr. Hillquit is Tammany's one serious rival in this campaign. The past history of split fusions in New York indicates that the chances of Mr. Mitchel's election are small. Straw votes, political meetings of unprecedented size and enthusiasm, and the admissions of politicians of all parties, have convinced most candid observers, we believe, that Hillquit is the real anti-Tammany candidate. If the independent liberals rally to his support the final issue will not be in doubt.

There can be even less liberal hesitation in this cam-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

paign because of the personal qualifications of Mr. Hillquit to hold office. His rare ability is conceded by his most ardent opponents. Only a year ago The New Republic was urging his election to Congress on the grounds of his marked attainments as a thinker and leader. Nor does any candid man take seriously the political pretense that he is disloyal and pro-German because of his insistence on a speedy and general peace negotiated on the statesmanlike program accepted in principle by President Wilson in his reply to the Pope, or because of his demand that the constitutional rights of Americans be maintained in war as well as in peace.

The real issues of this campaign include but transcend the ancient and honorable tiger hunt which has been the picturesque feature of New York politics time out of mind. Even in this fight Mr. Hillquit's method of attack is superior to that of Mr. Mitchel. Tammany Hall dreads a well organized, ever increasing working class political party far more than the temporary fusions and diffusions of those whom it is pleased to call "silk-stocking reformers" and "goo-goo politicians." It recognizes a real menace in a party pledged to fill openly and legitimately those needs of the common people which the ward boss fills in secret and for his own private aggrandizement.

The issues also include but transcend efficiency and economy in government business. Mr. Hillquit is too wise a man to batter down such admirable constructive work as Mr. Mitchel's experts have achieved. If elected mayor he will appreciate, as the Milwaukee administration did, the need for non-partisan expert aid and assistance.

To the progressive voter Mr. Mitchel's fatal weakness is to be found in the chief virtue which his supporters attribute to him—that his loyalty is "to government itself." It is the foremost tenet of the progressive that mere excellence of technique is not adequate to the solution of modern problems of government. The technique must be applied in the service of a humanistic concept of government. Even Mr. Mitchel's most ardent admirers do not claim that he cherishes such a concept of government. The most which the liberal claims for him is that he has done the old job better than it has ever been done before. But a city harrassed by exorbitant prices, extortionate rents, and at the mercy of a small coterie of irresponsible public utility officials; a people who cry for bread and decent places to live, and who demand their constitutional right to think and speak and print their newspapers even in time of war; such a city and such a people have no interest in the ideal of government for government's sake. They want, and justly, a government for the sake of the citizens of the community, a government which shall wisely and constructively use its vast potential powers to relieve human distress and provide for human needs. A city for the people is their ideal.

This is the great issue of the campaign. Mr. Hillquit starts where every liberal should start—with a definite idea of human emancipation; and he stands on a platform dedicated to its achievement by orderly and constitutional means. It is a platform built of definite, concrete, practical planks. It is a program of which no liberal can afford to be ignorant.

Mr. Hillquit, we believe, is the only candidate who can win against Tammany this year. It is certain that his candidacy offers the only permanent cure for Tammany domination. Mr. Hillquit's ability is unquestioned. Above all he is the only candidate who combines a vision of a city for the people with a definite program for its realization. As such, he deserves the vote of every progressive. Respectfully yours,

GILBERT ROE, MARY WHITE OVINGTON,
MARY WARE DENNETT, RANDOLPH BOURNE,
ALFRED KUTTNER, FREDA KIRCHWAY,
EVANS CLARK, ALLSTON DANA,
JAMES P. WARBASSE, JOHN MARTIN.

Democracy and Woman Suffrage

SIR: To believe in democracy is to believe in woman suffrage. We all profess to believe in representative government, we all profess to believe in equal rights, equal opportunities for all classes, yet in this country more than one-half of the people have no direct voice in the government, no direct voice in the making of the laws. Professor Ross, in his "Social Psychology," says that women "are, in a sense, a social class shut out from many of the bracing and individualizing experiences that come to men." A community is unable to reach its highest development when one-half of its members are denied an active part in all the forces which make for its welfare. As the community gives to each individual woman the opportunity to develop all that is best and highest in her, so in turn will that community be benefited.

When women are given the responsibility of the ballot, they will develop the capacity to use it intelligently. With the privilege of voting there will come to them the desire to study political conditions. Women are clearly developing a social conscience. In all branches of constructive social work, we find women workers in large numbers. Women are seeking a knowledge of the underlying causes of our social wrongs and injustices. They know that child labor dwarfs the growing child, physically, mentally, morally and spiritually, and they know that the future of society rests on the children of to-day. They know that the home will be destroyed if we permit an economic system which underpays and overworks the fathers, and forces the mothers to leave their children in order to contribute to the family income. They know that it is not just for the few to live in ease and luxury gained at the expense of the many. Is it not fair to assume that these intelligent, socially minded women will seek to put in office those men who, they trust, will try to secure legislation which will abolish child labor, unemployment, overwork, low wages, dark tenements and commercialized vice? It is this social conscience, expressed in action, in constructive work, and through the ballot, that will in time bring about a new social order.

It is undoubtedly true that women have higher ideals and higher moral standards than men. There are fewer criminals among women than among men, and the majority of women believe in the single standard of morality. It is often said that women have an "indirect" influence. If they had the power which the ballot would give them, they would have a direct influence also, because power brings influence. Political life would be lifted to a higher plane, and the moral standards of the entire community would be raised. These higher standards of morality and higher ideals would finally become embodied in the law, since the law is the result of the corporate will of the people expressed by means of the ballot. If there are any who would say that high ideals have not a redemptive power, may I recall to your minds these words, "Where there is no vision, the people perish."

FANNIE CATHERINE BOIES.

Brooklyn, New York.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A War of Men

Under Fire, the Story of a Squad, by Henri Barbusse. Translated by Fitzwater Wray. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. $1.50.

IN the presence of this book one is in the presence of the fact. It is known to all of us that where humanity is at grips with its own destiny it is the habit of men to lie. The great finalities are always concealed from us in their full gravity and terror—the finalities of birth, of love, of death. And because they are concealed from us, with the zeal of the frightened savage that is in all of us, we go from catastrophe to catastrophe as numb as fools. Only occasionally, against the instinct of the savage that bids us sprinkle holy water and burn incense and heap flowers, does a man arrive who accepts his naked destiny and insists on its actual nature against every kind of incantation. Such a man, confronted by war, is Henri Barbusse, the Parisian journalist who incorporates his whole experience in this book.

It is unnecessary to have been at the front to judge of M. Barbusse's veracity. One does not need to have killed a woman to accept Crime and Punishment. Under Fire, as the sensitive translation is called, impresses its veracity in revealing its saturation with the war. There are other experiences of the war, as there are other men, but this is invincibly complete. It is a book that is no more to be questioned than the diary of Captain Scott or the deathless pages of Tolstoy. It composes the war for our understanding, making us familiar at the beginning with the men who are going to die, initiating us into trench life before the charge is launched over the top, ending the book in a supreme symbolism. But the wise composition that unites Under Fire is no more artificial than the due supervision of words as they stream from one's own brain to the penpoint. The facts have been disposed, even as a pointilliste disposes colors, only to keep them true.

Against the tale that M. Barbusse has told there is the conspiracy of a thousand conventions. He is a Frenchman fighting for France, la belle France, in what many consider the last extremity of her effort to remain a "first-class" power. To sustain that effort it is vital, even if untruth is required, to give a good account of the organization of the army and its esprit. Not only should he define favorably the motives that inspire the soldier but he should show the happy democratic relations that exist between soldier and officer, the satisfaction of the soldier with the general staff and his comprehension of the plans of the army, the joyous reception that awaits him on leave of absence, the self-immolation of the civilians in touch with the army, the honesty of contractors, the sad reluctance of brilliant young men not permitted to fight in the trenches, the evil behavior of the enemy, the heroism of the war. Of the more obvious conventions these are a few, but more subtle conventions abound as to personal attitude. A good patriot is not supposed to tell the world of filth, of lice, of corpses in ridiculous attitudes, of bad food, of muck in language, of bloodshed sought and enjoyed. If a man tells these things or breathes a word contrary to the unanimity of national purpose, he is treasonable. The facts are of no consequence. The impossibility of keeping them suppressed is of no consequence. If the sun rises on a national delinquency or ineptitude, it is the sun that is treasonable. From the guns of such a conspiracy M. Barbusse is also under fire.

But when one has faced machine-guns, it appears, it is not impossible to face machine-minds. One can feel in M. Barbusse a disdain for those feeble men of Europe who, within boundaries insisted upon by themselves, brought about a war that is the crashing bankruptcy of all their theories, all their pretensions, their idols, their sanctity. With demonology their last resource in order to strengthen once again the political boundaries that intensify differences in language and custom, they ask M. Barbusse to take his mind from the actuality he has experienced, and disregard the war as a harvest of their statesmanship. But the author of Under Fire is too sure of war not to be sure of something about peace which is more than non-war. He is for peace, not a peace that will save his own skin now but a peace that will be embodied in the plans of a society which takes full stock of its own bestiality, its own madness.

It is not the picturesque beginning of this book that lets one see M. Barbusse the accusant of war. He is content at the beginning to give us the mucky trench, the rag-bag cave-dwellers who are his comrades, the Falstaffian humor of their masculinity, the jocularity that is the jewel in the toad. The first chapter is called In the Earth; it is properly named. It is earthy in its jests at the old territorials who straggle by, "worn-out and trench-foul veterans"; earthy in its grim silence at the passing Africans, eyes "like balls of ivory or onyx"; earthy in its sneers for the penmen who visit the trench. The first glimmerings of the seriousness of battle are not utterly somber. "The smell of fresh blood was enough to bring your heart up," but that is from glad men "whom the depths of horror have given back." The impression is allowed to accumulate fairly and steadily. There is Eudoxie, the ethereal girl pursued by an oaf. There is the dizzying complexity of a great army entraining. There is the little soldier bereft, by an accident of the mails, from his week's reunion with his wife. The misery of cold Fouillade, imprisoned by his pennilessness in a wet barn, dreaming of his scented Pyrenees—this is one episode of those remissions from fighting which are described in keen detail. The most eloquent tells of that stolen journey into occupied territory on which Poterloo got home—to see Clotilde through the window, smiling by the side of a Boche officer, "not a forced smile, not a debtor's smile, non, a real smile that came from *her,* that she gave." It is on an adventure with Poterloo, to seek somewhere for a trace of his house in the eviscerated countryside, that the tocsin begins to sound. Just as at lovely seaside places one sometimes, a little inland, comes on a spot made foul by the heaped refuse of the settlement, so Poterloo and the narrator pass through the spot where is heaped the human refuse of the fight. There are pages here, honorable pages, nobly painful, that it would be sacrilege to quote. It is at this point, perhaps, with the disaster to Poterloo, that one is gripped by the inhuman remorselessness of all too human device.

No description of bombardment surpasses M. Barbusse's, even in translation. And no description of going forward, so it seems to me, can equal his chapter Under Fire. To quote from it is unfair. It is like giving one stilled picture of a terrific movement. But there is a glimpse of the author's total attitude in the following passage that demands its inclusion:

"'What are they doing, those chaps?'—'It's to climb up by.'

"We are ready. The men marshal themselves, still silently, their blankets crosswise, the helmet-straps on the chin, leaning on their rifles. I look at their pale, contracted, and reflective faces. They are not soldiers, they are men. They are not adventurers, or warriors, or made

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for human slaughter, neither butchers nor cattle. They are laborers and artisans whom one recognizes in their uniforms. They are civilians uprooted, and they are ready. They await the signal for death or murder; but you may see, looking at their faces between the vertical gleams of their bayonets, that they are simply men.

"Each one knows that he is going to take his head, his chest, his belly, his whole body, and all naked, up to the rifles pointed forward, to the shells, to the bombs piled and ready, and above all to the methodical and almost infallible machine-guns—to all that is waiting for him yonder and is now so frightfully silent—before he reaches the other soldiers that he must kill. They are not careless of their lives, like brigands, nor blinded by passion like savages. In spite of the doctrines with which they have been cultivated they are not inflamed. They are above instinctive excesses. They are not drunk, either physically or morally. It is in full consciousness, as in full health and full strength, that they are massed there to hurl themselves once more into that sort of madman's part imposed on all men by the madness of the human race. One sees the thought and the fear and the farewell that there is in their silence, their stillness, in the mask of tranquillity which unnaturally grips their faces. They are not the kind of hero one thinks of, but their sacrifice has greater worth than they who have not seen them will ever be able to understand."

Only by such profound acceptance of his comrades is M. Barbusse enabled to speak as he does in the concluding chapter, and also in that moment of superb magnanimity at the end of the advance when the dignified Bertrand permits himself to say, "It was necessary," and adds that immaculate tribute, "There is one figure that has risen above the war and will blaze with the beauty and strength of his courage. . . ."

It was necessary! One does not doubt that M. Barbusse has himself said so, in the face of all it means. But in the domicile that his mind gives this war there is no mysticism, no patriotism, no acquiescence. He knows that the war is evil. He has accepted it as the lesser of two evils. His book is great because it is able to encompass everything, even the necessity of living by dying.

F. H.

TIFFANY & CO.

JEWELRY AND SILVERWARE

INDIVIDUAL IN DESIGN
THOROUGH IN WORKMANSHIP

FIFTH AVENUE AND 37TH STREET
NEW YORK

Sociologic Fiction

King Coal, by Upton Sinclair. New York: The Macmillan Company. $1.50.

YOU must judge the American sociological novelist by standards of sociological pertinency rather than of literary art. Whether it is Winston Churchill exposing the capitalistic taint in the church, or Ernest Poole extending the family into the Gary school, or Upton Sinclair revealing the bestialities of the stockyards, you never look for those subtleties of personal life or for those living and breathing people that make the good novelist's art. The sociological raconteur uses people, but only as bricks to build his institutional edifice. It is the family, church, industry, that the story is really about. It is the institution that is the hero or villain, and the institution either in process of reformation or in shrieking need of it. The purpose of the story is to "show conditions," and the significance is frankly the message that something ought to be done about it. Where the literary artist would let the institution and its "message" play insistently out of the palpitating life of the individuals, caught in the struggle with it and busy with a thousand personal desires and adjustments, the sociological novelist sharply isolates institutional consciousness and denies his people thoughts and feelings that do not contribute directly to the missionary effect he wants to produce. Zola still lives because, though the master of the sociological novelist, he laboriously painted in every segment of his canvas, documenting sensual impression and confused aspiration, as well as institutional circumstance, so as to produce, through sheer massiveness and breadth, a feeling of personal life.

The Americans are less industrious, and consequently they are under a certain responsibility of showing that their work "shows conditions" better than would a sober report or generalized narrative. The theory is, of course, that the fictional form will make them more widely read. So they throw their material into dramatic shape, arrange the incidents cumulatively, give their characters fictitious names, endow them with conversation, and presumably get a more brilliant effect. All we have a right to ask, therefore, of such a novel is that its sociology be sound and true, and its "message" urgent. Such a story should not pretend to be more than a movie transcription of life. It is sociological observation "filmed." There is no claim to artistic value, and we do not ask for any. All we say is, Does the novel make visible conditions as they are and as they ought to be speedily altered?

Judged from this standard, I should say that Upton Sinclair's King Coal was a most satisfactory effort at fictional sociology. Technically it reads like a stenographic

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

report run through the mould of a melodrama. All the same, it is far superior to a book like Ernest Poole's His Family, which, although constructed with more literary tact, had its sociology of both education and the family so lamentably strained and off the key. Ernest Poole erred in attempting art. You have the irritating task of disentangling the sociology from the well meant but clumsy personal characterization, and when you get it disentangled you find it is neither sound nor true. Upton Sinclair pleases because he makes it so easy to unwarp the melodrama from this picture of the servitude of unorganized labor in a great mining camp of the American West. The soundness and truth of the sociology are fortified by "eight million words of evidence" collected in the investigations of the great Colorado coal strike of 1913-14. Upton Sinclair slaps melodrama and sociology together so honestly as to make it easy for you to believe that "practically all the characters are real persons, and every incident which has social significance is not merely a true incident but a typical one."

You discard the rich young hero who, fresh from his sociological courses at college, goes to work incognito in a coal mine to test out what he has learned, but you retain the brutal intrigue, the almost Turkish oppression, the terrorism of suspicion and fear which compose life within the armed camp of the "Pine Creek Coal Co." You discard his sensational escape into the private car of his friend, the son of the owner of the mines, and the ineptitude of the little plutocratic party, but you retain a sense of the callous indifference with which the owners hand over labor troubles to the slave driving foremen. You discard the decayed gentility of the company official to whom the hero, in disgrace, makes appeal, but you retain a vivid insight into that crew of petty helots, and provocateurs into whose hands these industrial helots, the mine workers, are delivered. You discard the amorous troubles of Red Mary and her confrontation with the dainty capitalistic sweetheart, but you do not lose the horror of the crushing out of hope in these grim and terrible camps. Throughout the book, the "social significance" of the incidents seems as impressive as the dramatic invention is unconvincing. You smile at the plot, but you say, These are conditions as they are, in all their almost incredible detail of exploitation.

Upton Sinclair does his work so well, however, as to leave you undecided whether an honest generalized summary of the labor camp life, such as that Colorado judicial decision which he prints in his postscript as proof of the accuracy of his work, would not have carried just as much dramatic conviction. Yet King Coal is an exceedingly vivacious narrative, boyishly sincere. If it proves to carry its "message" further than did the "eight million words," it will have to be preferred to any unfictional account. Other writers, however, might not strike so good a balance, might not make their fiction so easy to unwind. Their invention might grotesquely distort the conditions they were trying to render vivid. We are left with the question whether there is really any place for anything between the straightforward social document and the work of literary art in which the writer not only keeps the faith towards his sociological material, but creates also a drama of personal life. But if we are to have something else, King Coal is perhaps as good a compromise as we are likely ever to get.

The "message" needs no paraphrasing. The total impression the reader gets is one of outraged wonder that Assyrian centers of iniquity like these camps should have grown up in a country with any intuition whatever for democracy. Where political boundaries have been made to coincide with the limits of corporation property, these camps have become actual little industrial principalities within the state, armed and barricaded against the world, and "justified" in any oppression by the plea of an "industrial necessity" which parodies the "military necessity" of the state. These camps represent the systematic squeezing of the worker almost to the last detail that human ingenuity could suggest. The system shows the will-to-exploit almost gone insane and run amuck. Scruple, legality, tradition, humaneness, have collapsed, and brutal power acts unrestrained. King Coal shows step by step the ingenuity of extortion, the difficulty of protest or revolt, the organized espionage which crushes any effort at organization. The direction of the industrially subjugated has become an engineering task like the mining of coal. The workers are so much wood and stone to be manipulated into the mine, and so much human slag to be destroyed with the other refuse. Only because the human instrument shows animal perversity and resistance has this technique of subjugation been turned over by corporations not to engineers but to the terrorism of criminaloid foremen. Will the war do anything to this terrible industrial slavery? King Coal provides a lurid but convincing background against which to understand the present industrial revolt.

R. B.

Restricting Matthew Arnold

Matthew Arnold. How To Know Him, by Stuart P. Sherman. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co. $1.50.

MR. SHERMAN seems to accept a little passively Matthew Arnold's saying that his public would be only "the body of quiet, reasonable people," and to write this presentation of him without having young readers much in mind. Was it, perhaps, at his moment of deepest disillusion that Matthew Arnold so turned away from restless, ignorant youth? When, at some time or other, to normal bookish inexperience, reality seems to refuse to respond to confidence, to refuse to be much more than a call to stoic endurance, his poems always remain expressive, solacing, stimulating. But Mr. Sherman's book submerges any such power in his vision of the older Arnold of the Essays, who was devoted to "the abiding," and "a center and refuge and stronghold for the general reader, for the man of affairs, for any man, who, conscious of the breadth and brevity of life, wishes a guide to the highlands and mountain tops of literature—wishes death, when it overtakes him, to find him in good company and noble occupation."

It was part of Matthew Arnold's cool self-control that, though he was not modest, he was never generous and loving toward his youth—and his own older vision of his poems, unfortunately, was as unfeeling as Mr. Sherman's. "They represent, on the whole, the main movement of mind in the last quarter of a century [he was writing in 1869], and thus they will probably have their day as people become conscious to themselves of what that movement of mind is." One would rather have it put that they express his particular melancholy at turning away from fixed and established and aristocratic order toward approaching democracy, and also the general melancholy of youth when it first feels disillusion. Love, his own powers, and his

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Important New Books

DO WE NEED A NEW IDEA OF GOD

By EDMUND H. REEMAN

Dr. Reeman delineates the most courageous traditions of the modern world; he seeks to destroy belief in an omniscient omnipotent, yet capricious deity; he seeks to destroy the popular dogma of the nineteenth century—belief in the beneficence of nature. Yet, as a whole, his book is constructive and eminently practical. He has sought to address himself as simply and directly as his subject permits to the growing multitude of men and women who find but little meaning in the conventional terms of religion. In comparing this book with "God, the Invisible King," by H. G. Wells, the *Baltimore Sun* says:—"In many ways, the volume of Edmund H. Reeman is a little saner, less emotionally overwrought than that of Mr. Wells."

$1.00 *net*

JAY COOKE

Financier of the Civil War

By Ellis P. Oberholtzer, Ph. D.

A new and cheaper edition of this famous work. Two volumes, boxed, 8vo, $3.00 net per set.

HISTORIC DRESS IN AMERICA

By Elisabeth McClellan

Volume I, 1607-1800, $10.00 *net.*

Volume II, 1800-1870, $6.00 *net.*

GEORGE W. JACOBS & CO.

Philadelphia, Pa.



The Instant Summons

'Instant, through copse and heath, arose
Bonnets and spears and bended bows;
* * * * *
As if the yawning hill to heaven
A subterranean host had given."

The whistled summons of Roderick Dhu, the hero of Scott's "Lady of the Lake," caused his Highland warriors literally to spring from the earth. Ere the echo died away, from behind bush and rock emerged the loyal and ready clansmen. In armed silence they awaited their chieftain's bidding and typified his might.

Today the Commander-in-Chief of our nation's armed forces and the resources behind them, can, by lifting the telephone receiver, instantaneously set in motion all the vast machinery of warfare, munitions, transportation and food conservation.

Like the Scottish mountaineers, the American people must stand in loyal readiness to perform any service in furtherance of the nation's high aim. Such a spirit of co-operation and sacrificing of individual interests can alone make certain the accomplishment of the great task to which our country is committed.

AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY
AND ASSOCIATED COMPANIES

One Policy *One System* *Universal Service*

RED GUM

"AMERICA'S FINEST CABINET WOOD"

IS INCREASING ITS LEAD AS THE FAVORITE TRIM IN GREAT BUILDINGS WHOSE OWNERS SEEK DISTINCTION AS WELL AS INTELLIGENT ECONOMY AND PROVED DURABILITY

Ask your architect to investigate

RED GUM

GUM LUMBER MFRS. ASSN.

1322 Bank of Commerce Bldg. MEMPHIS, TENN.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

belief in God all seem to have failed Matthew Arnold early in his thirties. And he might have kept a livelier memory of his poems as the outlet for his sense of deception. It is true that an older reader is chiefly struck by how little Matthew Arnold could ever really have enjoyed his "illusions"—by how little he liked, for instance, his few moments of "romantic" love, the "storms," or what he called "an unnatural over-heat." But younger readers are more apt to be grateful for his expression of disillusion and dismay, and to hear the joy in his call to stoicism. While he struggled, he did undoubtedly enjoy feeling "alone." Mr. Sherman speaks of the comfort he got from being stoic as "feeble," but it does not seem feeble to unexigent youth, which catches glad courage from Empedocles.

> "Yea, I take myself to witness
> That I have loved no darkness,
> Sophisticated no truth,
> Nursed no delusion,
> Allowed no fear."

Probably one effect Matthew Arnold will make, as Mr. Sherman quotes him, is of how much, after all, he always disliked adventure—strongly disliked being unprotected. He had never much real buoyancy and curiosity. He had his "habitual world of thought and morality" and the world outside he saw as "feverish contact," a "gradual furnace" which kills youth and

> "leaves the fierce necessity to feel,
> But takes away the power."

He dreaded America. It is perhaps a pity that Mr. Sherman makes almost the most of Arnold's dislike of us, and does not make it disappear in his larger dislike of anything disturbing to aristocratic order. Probably on the whole we had less of his attention than Mr. Sherman's many references to his dislike would have us believe. And too his dislike is not so interesting as his utter aloofness. When he came to America at the age of sixty on a lecture tour, his letters abound in conscious condescension and he contrives a friendly note only about a few of our learned and well-to-do class, which was, after all, precisely his own, —about men with as fine an enthusiasm for letters and the classic Good. But for the most part he had no suspicion of kinship. He wrote home: "You should read Carnegie's book Triumphant Democracy. He and most Americans are simply unaware that nothing in the book touches the capital defect of life over here: namely, that compared with life in England it is uninteresting, so without savour and without depth." That Arnold should dislike American democracy is really not as important as that he could feel so aloof, not only from us, but also from his fellow-Britisher, who had been driven to hunt for something like depth and savor outside Scotland.

Indeed, Matthew Arnold—what does not seem to matter if one reads him in green youth—is forbiddingly unresponsive to anything contemporary, to ideas if clothed in flesh and blood. He wrote much of his literary and social and religious criticism with a view to that "genuine social renovation" which he quotes George Sand as saying will come from "a good direction given by ourselves to our hearts and consciences." He is, he says, only a "Liberal of the future." He never enhances the actual present. Mr. Sherman gives a quotation from St. Paul and Protestantism, which raises an amusing question about why it is more unsatisfactory to experience than to ardent, hopeful youth!

"Everyone knows how being in love changes for the time a man's spiritual atmosphere, and makes animation and buoyancy where before there was flatness and dulness. One may even say that this is the reason why being in love is so popular with the whole human race,—because it relieves in so irresistible a manner the tedium or depression of commonplace human life."

Is this a tribute to love, or an arraignment of the living present? And is not inexperience rather likely to discover only the first?

Mr. Sherman has often the rare grace of present-mindedness when he writes of men of letters, and so one wonders the more how much he intended the removal of Matthew Arnold from the interests of the young and anxiously questioning. He insists on his being a "reconstructive force" for the twentieth century as well as an "unavoidable writer" of the nineteenth. But he does not point out with the vividness of the here and now just how Matthew Arnold reconstructs, just how his message renews itself with each generation. He has made plain, however, that Arnold loved "classical" work, work done with a sense of recognized authority, of form, order and measure, and that he favored institutions, holding that the "great and abiding interests of society, like religion, education, and literature should be . . . instituted and maintained in the grand style."

Sometimes Mr. Sherman's expression, in what is generally a grave and thoroughly well considered book, is a little surprising. "Winsome" and "fascinating" seem inappropriate terms. And his opening sentence does not give promise of all the good criticism one gets: "Matthew Arnold is a charming but not an altogether conciliatory writer."

E. B.

Contributors

in this issue

NORMAN ANGELL is an Englishman who spent his youth in the western part of the United States, then returned to Europe to do newspaper work in England and France. He was general manager of the Paris Daily Mail from 1905 to 1914. He is the author of The Great Illusion and other books on international affairs. He is now in this country.

HARRY W. FRANTZ is one of a group of men from Leland Stanford University, California, who are serving as ambulance drivers in the American Field Service. The unit is now in Albania.

JULIA CLARK HALLAM is a Chicago contributor

THE VOICE IN THE SILENCE
Thomas S. Jones, Jr.
"The book is full of loveliness—like the quiet breathing of exquisite forest air. Some of the poems are so still that they leave the impression of music wrought of silences. . . . We need such poetry more and more, as we plunge more deeply into these terrific times—which somehow leave one after all so curiously calm, with the sense of exaltation one feels in the presence of all sublime things."
450 COPIES, FCAP OCTAVO, ON VAN GELDER HAND-MADE PAPER, $1.00 NET.
25 COPIES ON JAPAN VELLUM, $2.00 NET.
THOMAS BIRD MOSHER, PORTLAND, MAINE

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED